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THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 



By the same AUTHOR 

REVOLUTION AND REACTION IN 

MODERN FRANCE 
THE GREEK VIEW OF LIFE 
THE MEANING OF GOOD 
A MODERN SYMPOSIUM 
JUSTICE AND LIBERTY 
LETTERS FROM JOHN CHINAMAN 
RELIGION AND IMMORTALITY 
RELIGION : A FORECAST 
APPEARANCES 

THE WAR AND THE WAY OUT 
AFTER THE WAR 

ETC., ETC. 



THE EUROPEAN 
ANARCHY 



X 



)A 



.^' 



>^ 



.:y 



BY 



G5 LOWES DICKINSON 




LONDON: GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD. 
RUSKIN HOUSE 40 MUSEUM STREET, W.C, 



.TJ34- 



First published in igi6 



Copyright in U.S.A. 
{All rights reserved) 

APR 25 1916 4S 



CONTENTS 

PAGE 

1. Introduction . . . . -9 

Europe since the Fifteenth Century— Machiavellianism- 
Empire and the Balance of Power. 

2. The Triple Alliance and the Entente . 14 

Belgian Dispatches of 1905-14. 

3. Great Britain . . . . .to 

The Policy of Great Britain— Essentially an Overseas 
Power. 

4. France . . . . • • *4 

The Policy of France since 1870— Peace and Imperialism 
— Conflicting Elements. 

5. Russia . . . • . '3^ 

The Policy of Russia — Especially towards Austria. 

6. Austria-Hungary . ' . . • 36 

The Policy of Austria-Hungary — Especially towards the 
Balkans. 

7. Germany . . . . '37 

The Policy of Germany — From 1866 to the Decade 
1890-1900 — A Change. 

8. Opinion in Germany . . . .46 

German *' Romanticism " — New Ambitions. 

7 



8 GONTENTS 

PAGE 

9. Opinion about Germany . . '57 

Bourdon — Beyens — Cambon — Summary. 

10. German Policy from the Decade 1890-1900 68 

Relation to Great Britain — The Navy. 

11. Vain Attempts at Harmony . • 77 
Great Britain's Efforts for Arbitration — Mutual Suspicion. 

12. Europe since the Decade i 890-1 900 . 94 

13. Germany and Turkey . . .98 

The Bagdad Railway. 

14. Austria and the Balkan's . . .106 

15. Morocco . . . . .114 

16. The Last Years .... 122 
Before the War— The Outbreak of War. 

17. The Responsibility and the Moral . 134 

The Pursuit of Power and Wealth. 

18. The Settlement .... 141 

19. The Change Needed . . . 149 

Change of Outlook and Change of System — An Inter- 
national League — International Law and Control. 



THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 

I. Introduction. 

In the great and tragic history of Europe 
there is a turning-point that marks the 
defeat of the ideal of a world-order and 
the definite acceptance of international 
anarchy. That turning-point is the emer- 
gence of the sovereign State at the end of 
the fifteenth century. And it is symbolical of 
all that was to follow that at that point stands^ 
looking down the vista of the centuries, 
the brilliant and sinister figure of Machia- 
velli. Erom that date onwards international 
policy has meant Machiavellianism. Some- 
times the masters of the craft, like Catherine 
de Medici or Napoleon, have avowed it ; 
sometimes, like Erederick the Great, they 
have disclaimed it. But always they have 
practised it. They could not, indeed, prac- 
tise anything else. Eor it is as true of an 
aggregation of States as of an aggregation 



lo THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 

of individuals that^ whatever moral senti- 
ments may prevail, if there is no common 
law and no common force the best inten- 
tions will be defeated by lack of confidence 
and security. Mutual fear and mutual sus- 
picion, aggression masquerading as defence 
and defence masquerading as aggression, 
will be the protagonists in the bloody drama ; 
and there will be, what Hobbes truly asserted 
to be the essence of such a situation, a 
chronic state of war, open or veiled. For 
peace itself will be a latent war ; and the 
more the States arm to prevent a conflict 
the more certainly will it be provoked, since 
to one or another it will always seem a 
better chance to have it now than to have 
it on worse conditions later. Some one 
State at any moment may be the immediate 
offender ; but the main and permanent 
offence is comtnon to all States. It is the 
anarchy which they are all responsible for 
perpetuating. 

While this anarchy continues the struggle 
between States will tend to assumte a certain 
stereotyped form. One will endeavour to 
acquire supremacy over the others for 
motives at once of security and of domi- 
nation, the others will combine to defeat it, 



INTRODUCTION ii 

and history will turn upon the two poles 
of empire and the balance of power. So 
it has been in Europe, and so it will con- 
tinue to be, until either empire is achieved, 
as once it was achieved by Rome, or a com- 
mon law and a common authority is estab- 
lished by agreement. In the past empire 
over Europe has been sought by Spain, by 
Austria, and by Erance ; and soldiers, p>oli- 
ticians, and professors in Germany have 
sought, and seek, to secure it now for Ger- 
many. On the other hand, Great Britain 
has long stood, as she stands now, for the 
balance of pwDwer. As ambitious, as quarrel- 
some, and as aggressive as other States, her 
geographical position has directed her aims 
overseas rather than toward the Continent 
of Euroj>e. Since the fifteenth century her 
power has never menaced the Continent. 
On the contrary, her own interest has dic- 
tated that she should resist there the enter- 
prise of empire, and join in the defensive 
efforts of the threatened States. To any 
State of Europe that has conceived the 
ambition to dominate the Continent this 
policy of England has seemed as contrary 
to the interests of civilization as the ix)licy 
of the Papacy appeared in Italy to an Italian 



12 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 

patriot like Machiavelli. He wanted Italy 
enslaved^ in order that it might be united. 
And so do some Germans now want Europe 
enslaved, that it may have peace under Ger- 
many. They accuse England of perpetu- 
ating for egotistic ends the state of anarchy. 
But it was not thus that Germans viewed 
British policy when the Power that was to 
give peace to Europe was not Germany, but 
France. In this long and bloody game the 
partners are always changing, and as part- 
ners change so do views. One thing only 
does not change, the fundamental anarchy. 
International relations, it is agreed, can only 
turn upon force. It is the disposition and 
grouping of the forces alone that can or 
does vary. 

But Europe is not the only scene of the 
conflict between empire and the balance. 
Since the sixteenth century the European 
States have been contending for mastery, not 
only over one another, but over the world. 
Colonial empires have risen and fallen. 
Portugal, Spain, Holland, in turn have won 
and lost. England and France have won, 
lost, and regained. In the twentieth century 
Great Britain reaps the reward of her 
European conflicts in the Empire (wrongly 



INTRODUCTION 13 

so-called) on which the sun never sets. 
Next to her comes France^, in Africa and the 
East ; while Germany looks out with dis- 
contented eyes on a world already occupied, 
and, cherishing the same ambitions all great 
States have cherished before her, finds the 
time too mature for their accomplishtnent 
by the methods that availed in the past. 
Thus, not only in Europe but on the larger 
stage of the world the international rivalry 
is pursued. But it is the same rivalry and 
it proceeds from the same cause : the mutual 
aggression and defence of beings living in 
a " state of nature." 

•Without this historical background no 
special study of the events that led up to 
the present war can be either just or intel- 
ligible. The feeling of every nation about 
itself and its neighbours is determined by the 
history of the past and by the way in which 
that history is regarded. The picture looks 
different from every point of view. Indeed, 
a comprehension of the causes of the war 
could only be fully attained by one who 
should know, not only the most secret 
thoughts of the few men who directly 
brought it about, but also the prejudices and 
preconceptions of the public opinion in each 



14 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 

nation. There is nobody who possesses these 
qualifications. But in the absence of such 
a historian these imperfect notes are set 
down in the hope that they may offer a 
counterpoise to some of the wilder passions 
that sweep over all peoples in time of war 
and threaten to prepare for Europe a future 
even worse than its past has been. 



2. The Triple Alliance and the Entente, 

First, let us remind ourselves in general 
of the situation that prevailed in Europe 
during the ten years preceding the war. It 
was in that period that the Entente between 
France, Russia, and England was formed 
and consolidated, over against the existing 
Triple Alliance between Germany, Austria, 
and Italy. Neither of these combinations 
was in its origin and purpose aggressive. ^ 

* The alliance between Germany and Austria, which 
dates from 1879, was formed to guarantee the two 
States against an attack by Russia. Its terms are : — 

'' I. If, contrary to what is to be expected and con- 
trary to the sincere desire of the two high contracting 
parties, one of the two Empires should be attacked by 
Russia, the two high contracting parties are bound 
reciprocally to assist one another with the whole 



ALLIANCE AND ENTENTE 15 

And, so far as Great Britain was concerned, 
the relations she entered into with France 
and with Russia 'were directed in each case to 
the settlement of long outstanding differences 
without special reference to the German 
Powers. But it is impossible in the Euro- 
pean anarchy that any arrangements should 
be made between any States which do not 

military force of their Empire, and further not to 
make peace except conjointly and by common consent. 
"2. If one of the high contracting Powers should be 
attacked by another Power, the other high contracting 
party engages itself, by the present act, not only not 
to support the aggressor against its ally, but at least 
to observe a benevolent neutrality with regard to the 
other contracting party. If, however, in the case sup- 
posed the attacking Power should be supported by 
Russia, whether by active co-operation or by military 
measures which should menace the Power attacked, 
then the obligation of mutual assistance with all mili- 
tary forces, as stipulated in the preceding article, would 
immediately come into force, and the military opera- 
tions of the high contracting parties would be in that 
case conducted jointly until the conclusion of peace." 

Italy acceded to the Alliance in 1882. The engage- 
ment is defensive. Each of the three parties is to 
come to the assistance of the others if attacked by 
a third party. 

The treaty of Germany with Austria was supple- 
mented in 1884 by a treaty with Russia, known as 
the " Reinsurance Treaty," whereby Germany bound 



1 6 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 

arouse suspicion in others. And the draw- 
ing together of the Powers of the Entente 
did in fact appear to Germany as a menace . 
She believed that she was being threatened 
by an aggressive combination, just as, on 
the other hand, she herself seemed to the 
Powers of the Entente a danger to be 
guarded against. This apprehension on the 
part of Germany is sometimes thought to 
have been mere pretence, but there is every 

herself not to join Austria in an attack upon Russia. 
This treaty lapsed in the year 1890, and the lapse, it 
is presumed, prepared the way for the rapprochemettt 
between Russia and France. 

The text of the treaty of 1894 between France and 
Russia has never been published. It is supposed to 
be a treaty of mutual defence in case of an aggressive 
attack. The Power from whom attack is expected is 
probably named, as in the treaty between Germany 
and Austria. It is probably for that reason that the 
treaty was not published. The accession of Great 
Britain to what then became known as the ^' Triple 
Entente " is determined by the treaty of 1904 with 
France, whereby France abandoned her opposition 
to the British occupation of Egypt in return for a 
free hand in Morocco ; and by the treaty of 1907 
with Russia, whereby the two Powers regulated their 
relations in Persia, Afghanistan, and Thibet. There 
is no mention in either case of an attack, or a defence 
against attack, by any other Power. 



ALLIANCE AND ENTENTE 17 

reason to suppose it to have been genuine. 
The policy of the Entente did in fact, on a 
number of occasions, come into colhsion 
with that of Germany. The arming and 
counter-arming was continuous. And the 
very fact that from the side of the Entente 
it seemed that Germany was always the 
aggressor, should suggest to us that from 
the other side the opposite impression would 
prevail. That, in fact, it did prevail is clear 
not only from the constant assertions of 
German statesmen and of the German Press, 
but from oontemporary observations made 
by the representatives of a State not itself 
involved in either of the opposing com- 
binations. The dispatches of the Belgian 
ambassadors at Berlin, Paris, and London 
during the years 1905 to 1914^ show a 

^ These were published by the Norddeutsche Allgc- 
meine Zeitung, and are reprinted under the title 
" Belgische Aktenstiicke," 1905-14 (Ernst Siegfried 
Mittler and Sons, Berlin). Their authenticity, as far 
as I know, has not been disputed. On the other 
hand, it is to be assumed that they have been very care- 
fully " edited " by the German to make a particular 
impression. My view of the policy of Germany or of 
the Entente is in no sense based upon them. I 
adduce them as evidence of contemporary feeling and 
opinion. 

2 



1 8 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 

constant impression that the Entente was a 
hostile combination directed against Ger- 
many and engineered, in the earlier years, 
for that purpose by King Edward VH. 
'This impression of the Belgian representa- 
tives is no proof, it is true, of the real in- 
tentions of the Entente, but it is proof of 
how they did in fact appear to outsiders. 
And it is irrelevant, whether or no it be 
true, to urge that the Belgians were in- 
doctrinated with the German view ; since 
precisely the fact that they could be so in- 
doctrinated would show that the view was 
on the face of it plausible. We see, then, 
in these dispatches the way in which the 
policy of the Entente could appear to 
observers outside it. I give illustrations 
from Berlin, Paris, and London. 

On May 30, 1908, Baron Greindl, 
Belgian Ambassador at Berlin, writes as 
follows : — 

Call it an alliance, entente, or what you will, the 
grouping of the Powers arranged by the personal 
intervention of the King of England exists, and if it 
is not a direct and immediate threat of war against 
Germany (it would be too much to say that it was that), 
it constitutes none the less a diminution of her security. 
The necessary pacifist declarations, which, no doubt, 



ALLIANCE AND ENTENTE 19 

will be repeated at Reval, signify very little, emanating 
as they do from three Powers which, like Russia and 
England, have just carried through successfully, with- 
out any motive except the desire for aggrandizement, 
and without even a plausible pretext, wars of conquest 
in Manchuria and the Transvaal, or which, like France, 
is proceeding at this moment to the conquest of 
Morocco, in contempt of solemn promises, and with- 
out any title except the cession of British rights, which 
never existed. 

On May 24, 1907, the Comte de Lalaing, 
Belgian Ambassador at London^ writes : — 

A certain section of the Press, called here the Yellow 
Press, bears to a great extent the responsibility for the 
hostile feeling between the two nations. ... It is plain 
enough that official England is quietly pursuing a policy 
opposed to Germany and aimed at her isolation, and 
that King Edward has not hesitated to use his personal 
influence in the service of this scheme. But it is cer- 
tainly exceedingly dangerous to poison public opinion 
in the open manner adopted by these irresponsible 
journals. 

Again, on July 28, 191 1, in the midst 
of the Morocco crisis, Baron Guillaume, 
Belgian Ambassador at Paris, writes : — 

I have great confidence in the pacific sentiments of 
the Emperor William, in spite of the too frequent 
exaggeration of some of his gestures. He will not 



20 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 

allow himself to be drawn on farther than he chooses 
by the exuberant temperament and clumsy manners 
of his very intelligent Minister of Foreign Affairs 
(Kiderlen-Waechter). I feel, in general, less faith in 
the desire of Great Britain for peace. She would not 
be sorry to see the others eat one another up. ... As 
I thought from the beginning, it is in London that the 
key to the situation lies. It is there only that it can 
become grave. The French will yield on all the 
points for the sake of peace. It is not the same with 
the English, who will not compromise on certain 
principles and certain claims. 



3. Great Britain. 

Having established this general fact that 
a state of mutual suspicion and fear pre- 
vailed between Germany and the Powers of 
the Triple Entente, let us next consider the 
positions and purposes of the various States 
involved. First, let us take Great Britain, 
of which we ought to know most. Great 
Britain is the head of an Empire, and of 
one, in point of territory and population, 
the greatest the world has ever seen. This 
Empire has been acquired by trade and 
settlement, backed or preceded by military 
force. And to acquire and hold it, it has 
been necessary, to wage war after war, not 



GREAT BRITAIN 21 

only overseas but on the continent of 
Europe. It is, however, as we have already 
noticed, a fact, and a cardinal fact, that 
since the fifteenth century British ambitions 
have not been directed to extending empire 
over the continent of Europe. On the 
contrary, we have resisted by arms every 
attempt made by other Powers in that 
direction. That is what we have meant by 
maintaining the " balance of power." We 
have acted, no doubt, in our own interest, 
or in what we thought to be such ; but in 
doing so we have made ourselves the 
champions of those European nations that 
have been threatened by the excessive 
power of their neighbours. British im- 
perialism has thus, for four centuries, 
not endangered but guaranteed the inde- 
pendence of the European States. Further, 
our Empire is so large that we can hardly 
extend it without danger of being unable 
to administer and protect it. We claim, 
therefore, that we have neither the need 
nor the desire to wage wars of conquest. 
But we ought not to be surprised if this 
attitude is not accepted without reserve by 
other nations. Eor during the last half- 
century we have, in fact, waged wars to 



2 2 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 

annex Egypt, the Soudan, the South African 
RepubUcs^ and Burmah, to say nothing of 
the succession of minor wars which have 
given us Zululand, Rhodesia, Nigeria, and 
Uganda. Odd as it does, I believe, 
genuinely seem' to most Englishmen^ we 
are regarded on the Continent as the most 
aggressive Power in the worlds although our 
aggression is not upon Europe. We can- 
not expect, therefore, that our professions 
of peaceableness should be taken very 
seriously by outsiders. Nevertheless it is, 
I believe, true that, at any rate during the 
last fifteen years, those professions have 
been genuine. Our statesmen, of both 
parties, have honestly desired and intended 
to keep the peace of the world. And they 
have been assisted in this by a genuine and 
increasing desire for peace in the nation. 
The Liberal Government in particular has 
encouraged projects of arbitration and of dis- 
armament ; and Sir Edward Grey is prob- 
ably the most pacific Minister that ever held 
office in a great nation. But our past in- 
evitably discredits, in this respect, our 
future. And when we profess peace it 
is not unnatural that other nations should 
suspect a snare. 



GREAT BRITAIN 23 

Moreover, this desire for peace on our 
part is conditional upon the maintenance of 
the status quo and of our naval supremacy. 
Our vast interests in every part of the world 
make us a factor everywhere to be reckoned 
with. East, west, north, and south, no other 
Power can take a step without finding us 
in the path. Those States, therefore, which, 
unlike ourselves, are desirous farther to ex- 
tend their power and influence beyond the 
seas, must always reckon with us, particu- 
larly if, with that end in view, by increasing 
their naval strength they seem to threaten 
our supremacy at sea. This attitude of ours 
is not to be blamed, but it must always 
make difficult the maintenance of friendly 
relations with ambitious Powers. In the 
past our difficulties have been mainly with 
Russia and France. In recent years they 
have been with Germany. For Germany^ 
since 1898, for the first time in her history, 
has been in a position, and has made the 
choice, to become a World-Power. For 
that reason, as well as to protect her com- 
merce, she has built a navy. And for that 
reason we, pursuing our traditional policy 
of opposing the strongest continental Power, 
have drawn away from her and towards 



24 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 

Russia and Erance. We did not^ indeed, 
enter upon our arrangements with these 
latter Powers because of aggressive inten- 
tions towards Germany. But the growth of 
German sea-power drove us more and more 
to rely upon the Entente in case it should 
be necessary for us to defend ourselves. 
All this followed inevitably from the logic 
of the position, given the European anarchy. 
I state it for the sake of exposition, not of 
criticism, and I do not imagine any reader 
will quarrel with my statement. 



4. France. 

Let us turn now to Erance. Since 1870 
we find contending there, with varying for- 
tunes and strength^, two opposite currents 
of sentiment and policy. One was that of 
revanche against Germany, inspired by 
the old traditions of glory and hegemony, 
associated with hopes of a monarchist or 
imperialistic revolution, and directed, in 
the first place, to a recovery of Alsace- 
Lorraine. The other policy was that of 
peace abroad and socialistic transformation 
at home, inspired by the modern ideals of 



FRANCE 25 

justice and fraternity, and supported by the 
best of the younger generation of philoso- 
phers, poets, and artists, as well as by the 
bulk of the working class. Nowhere have 
these two currents of contemporary aspira- 
tion met and contended as fiercely as in 
France. The Dreyfus case was the most 
striking act in the great drama. But it was 
not the concluding one. French militarism^ 
in that affair, was scotched but not killed, 
and the contest was never fiercer than in 
the years immediately preceding the war. 
The fighters for peace were the Socialists, 
under their leader, Jaures, the one great man 
in the public life of Europe. While recog- 
nizing the urgent need for adequate national 
defence, Jaures laboured so to organize it 
that it could not be mistaken for nor con- 
verted into aggression. He laboured, at 
the same time, to remove the cause of the 
danger. In the year 19 13, under Swiss 
auspices, a meeting of French and German 
pacifists was arranged at Berne. To this 
meeting there proceeded 167 French depu- 
ties and 48 senators. The Baron d'Estour- 
nelles de Constant was president of the 
French bureau, and Jaures one of the vice- 
presidents. The result was disappointing. 



2 6 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 

The German participation was small and 
less influential than the Erench, and no 
agreement could be reached on the burning 
question of Alsace-Lorraine. But the 
French Socialists continued, up to the eve of 
the war, to fight for peace with an energy, 
an intelligence, and a determination shown 
in no other country. The assassination of 
Jaures was a symbol of the assassination of 
peace ; but the assassin was a French- 
man. , 

For if, in France, the current for peace 
ran strong in these latter years, so did the 
current for war. French chauvinism had 
waxed and waned, but it was never extin- 
guished. After 1870 it centred not only 
about Alsace-Lorraine, but also about the 
colonial expansion which took from that 
date a new lease of life in France, as it 
had done in England after the loss of the 
American colonies. Directly encouraged by 
Bismarck, France annexed Tunis in 1881. 
The annexation of Tunis led up at last to 
that of Morocco. Other territory had been 
seized in the Far East, and France became, 
next to ourselves, the greatest colonial 
Power. This policy could not be pursued 
without friction, and the principal friction 



FRANCE 27 

at the beginning was with ourselves. Once 
at least, in the Fashoda crisis, the two coun- 
tries were on the verge of war, and it was 
not till the Entente of 1904 that their rela- 
tions were adjusted on a basis of give-and- 
take. But by that time Germany had come 
into the colonial field, and the Entente with 
England meant new friction with Germany, 
turning upon French designs in Morocco. 
In this matter Great Britain supported her 
ally, and the incident of Agadir in 1 9 1 1 
showed the solidity of the Entente. This 
demonstration no doubt strengthened the 
hands of the aggressive elements in France, 
and later on the influence of M. Delcasse 
and M. Poincare was believed in certain 
quarters to have given new energy to this 
direction of French policy. This tendency 
to chauvinism was recognized as a menace 
to peace, and we find reflections of that 
feeling in the Belgian dispatches. Thus, for 
instance, Baron Guiilaume, Belgian minister 
at Paris, writes on February 21, 191 3, of 
M. Poincare :— 

It is under his Ministry that the military and 
slightly chauvinistic instincts of the French people have 
awakened. His hand can be seen in this modification ; 
it is to be hoped that his political intelligence, prac- 



2 8 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 

tical and cool, will save him from all exaggeration in 
this course. The notable increase of German arma- 
ments which supervenes at the moment of M. Poin- 
care's entrance at the Elysee will increase the danger 
of a too nationalistic orientation of the policy of France. 

Again^ on March 3, 1913 :— 

The German Ambassador said to me on Saturday : 
^' The political situation is much improved in the last 
forty-eight hours ; the tension is generally relaxed ; 
one may hope for a return to peace in the near future. 
But what does not improve is the state of public 
opinion in France and Germany with regard to the 
relations between the two countries. We are per- 
suaded in Germany that a spirit of chauvinism 
having revived, we have to fear an attack by the 
Republic. In France they express the same fear with 
regard to us. The consequence of these misunder- 
standings is to ruin us both. I do not know where we 
are going on this perilous route. Will not a man 
appear of sufficient goodwill and prestige to recall 
every one to reason? All this is the more ridiculous 
because, during the crisis we are traversing, the two 
Governments have given proof of the most pacific 
sentiments, and have continually relied upon one 
another to avoid conflicts." 

On this Baron Guillaume comments :— 

Baron Schoen is perfectly right. I am not in a 
position to examine German opinion, but I note every 



FRANCE 29 

day how public opinion in France becomes more 
suspicious and chauvinistic. One meets people who 
assure one that a war with Germany in the near future 
is certain and inevitable. People regret it, but make 
up their minds to it. . . . They demand, almost by 
acclamation, an immediate vote for every means of 
increasing the defensive power of France. The most 
reasonable men assert that it is necessary to arm to the 
teeth to frighten the enemy and prevent war. 

On April i6th he reports a conversation 
with M . Pichon, in which the latter says :— 

Among us, too, there is a spirit of chauvinism which 
is increasing, which I deplore, and against which we 
ought to react. Half the theatres in Paris now play 
chauvinistic and nationalistic pieces. 

The note of alarm becomes more urgent 
as the days go on. On January 16, 19 14, 
the Baron writes : — 

I have already had the honour to tell you that it is 
MM. Poincare, Delcasse, Millerand and their friends 
who have invented and pursued the nationalistic and 
chauvinistic policy which menaces to-day the peace 
of Europe, and of which we have noted the renais- 
sance. It is a danger for Europe and for Belgium. 
I see in it the greatest peril, which menaces the peace 
of Europe to-day ; not that I have the right to suppose 
that the Government of the Republic is disposed 



30 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 

deliberately to trouble the peace, rather I believe the 
contrary ; but the attitude that the Barthou Cabinet 
has taken up is, in my judgment, the determining 
cause of an excess of militaristic tendencies in Ger- 
many. 

It is clear from these quotations, and it 
is for this reason alone that I give them', 
that France, supported by the other mem- 
bers of the Triple Entente, could appear, 
and did appear, as much a menace to 
Germany as Germany appeared a menace to 
France ; that in France, as in other coun- 
tries, there was jingoism as well as pacifism ; 
and that the inability of French public 
opinion to acquiesce in the loss of Alsace- 
Lorraine was an active factor in the unrest 
of Europe. Once more I state these facts, 
I do not criticize them. They are essential 
to the comprehension of the international 
situation . 

V' 5. Russia, 

We have spoken so far of the West. But 
the Entente between France and Russia, 
dating from 1894, brought the latter into 
direct contact with Eastern policy. The 
motives and even the terms of the Dual 



RUSSIA 31 

Alliance are imperfectly known. Considera- 
tions of high finance are supposed to have 
been an important factor in it. But the main 
intention, no doubt, was to strengthen both 
Powers in the case of a possible conflict 
with Germany. The chances of war between 
Germany and France were thus definitely 
increased, for now there could hardly be an 
Eastern war without a Western one. Ger- 
many must therefore regard herself as com- 
pelled to wage war, if war should come, 
on both fronts ; and in all her fears or her 
ambitions this consideration must play a 
principal part. Friction in the East must 
involve friction in the West, and vice 
versa. What were the causes of friction 
in the West we have seen. Let us 
now consider the cause of friction in the 
East. 

The relations of Russia to Germany have 
been and are of a confused and complicated 
character, changing as circumstances and 
personalities change. But one permanent 
factor has been the sympathy between the 
governing elements in the two countries. 
The governing class in Russia, indeed, has 
not only been inspired by German ideas, it 
has been largely recruited from men of 



32 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 

German stock ; and it has manifested all the 
contempt and hatred which is characteristic 
of the German bureaucracy for the ideals of 
democracy, liberty, and free thought. The 
two Governments have always been ready to 
combine against popular insurrections, and 
in particular against every attempt of the 
Poles to recover their liberty. They have 
been drawn and held together by a common 
interest in tyranny, and the renewal of that 
co-operation is one of the dangers of the 
future. On the other hand, apart from and 
in opposition to this common political in- 
terest, there exists between the two nations 
a strong racial antagonism. The Russian 
temperament is radically opposed to the 
German. The one expresses itself in Pan- 
slavism, the other in Pangermanism . And 
this opposition of temperament is likely to 
be deeper and more enduring than the sym- 
pathy of the one autocracy with the other. 
But apart from this racial factor, there is 
in the south-east an opposition of political 
ambition. Primarily, the Balkan question is 
an Austro -Russian rather than a Russo- 
German one. Bismarck professed himself 
indifferent to the fate of the Balkan peoples, 
and even avowed a willingness to see Russia 



RUSSIA 33 

at Constantinople. But recent years have 
seen, in this respect, a great change. The 
alhance between Germany and Austria, 
dating from 1879, ^^^ become closer and 
closer as the Powers of the Entente have 
drawn together in what appeared to be a 
menacing combination. It has been, for 
some time past, a cardinal principle of 
German policy to support her ally in the 
Balkans, and this determination has been 
increased by German ambitions in the East. 
The ancient dream of Russia to possess 
Constantinople has been countered by the 
new German dream of a hegemony over the 
near East based upon the through route from 
Berlin via Vienna and Constantinople to 
Bagdad ; and this political opposition has 
been of late years the determining factor 
in the relationship of the two Powers. The 
danger of a Russo-German conflict has 
thus been very great, and since the Russo- 
French Entente Germany, as we have already 
pointed out, has seen herself menaced on 
either front by a war which would imme- 
diately endanger both. 

Turning once more to the Belgian dis- 
patches, we find such hints as the follow- 
ing. On October 24, 191 2, the Comte 

3 



34 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 

de Lalaing, Belgian Ambassador to London, 
writes as follows :— 

The French Ambassador, who mast have special 
reasons for speaking thus, has repeated to me several 
times that the greatest danger for the maintenance of 
the peace of Europe consists in the indiscipline and 
the personal poUcy of the Russian agents. They are 
almost all ardent Panslavists, and it is to them that 
must be imputed the responsibility for the events that 
are occurring. Beyond a doubt they will make them- 
selves the secret instigators for an intervention of their 
country in the Balkan conflict. 

On November 30^ 1912^ Baron de Beyens 
writes from Berlin : — 

At the end of last week a report was spread in the 
chancelleries of Europe that M. Sazonov had aban- 
doned the struggle against the Court party which 
wishes to drag Russia into war. 

On June 9, 1 9 1 4, Baron Guillaumfe writes 
from Paris : — 

Is it true that the Cabinet of St. Petersburg has 
imposed upon this country [France] the adoption of 
the law of three years, and would now bring to bear 
the whole weight of its influence to ensure its main- 
tenance ? I have not been able to obtain light upon 
this delicate point, but it would be all the more 
serious, inasmuch as the men who direct the Empire 



RUSSIA 35 

of the Tsars cannot be unaware that the effort thus 
demanded of the French nation is excessive, and 
cannot be long sustained. Is, then, the attitude of the 
Cabinet of St. Petersburg based upon the conviction 
that events are so imminent that it will be possible to 
use the tool it intends to put into the hands of its ally ? 

What a sinister vista is opened up by 
this passage ! I have no wish to in- 
sinuate that the suspicion here expressed 
was justified. It is the suspicion itself 
that is the point. Dimly we see, as 
through a mist, the figures of the architects 
of war. We see that the forces they wield 
are ambition and pride, jealousy and fear ; 
that these are all -pervasive ; that they affect 
all Governments and ^11 nations, and are 
fostered by conditions for which all alike are 
responsible. 

It will be understood, of course, that in 
bringing out the fact that there was national 
chauvinism in Russia and that this found 
its excuse in the unstable equilibrium of 
Europe, I am making no attack on Russian 
policy. I do not pretend to know 
whether these elements of opinion actually 
influenced the policy of the Government. 
But they certainly influenced German fears, 
and without a knowledge of them it is 



36 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 

impossible to understand German policy. 
The reader must bear in mind this source 
of friction along with the others when we 
come to consider that policy in detail. 



6. Austria- Hungary. 

Turning how to Austria -Hungary, we find 
in her the Power to whom the immediate 
occasion of the war was due, the Power, 
moreover, who contributed in large measure 
to its remoter causes. Austria-Hungary is a 
State, but not a nation. It has no natural 
bond to hold its populations together^ and 
it continues its political existence by force 
and fraud^ by the connivance and the self- 
interest of other States, rather than by any 
inherent principle of vitality. It is in rela- 
tion to the Balkan States that this insta- 
bility has been most marked and most 
dangerous. Since the kingdom of Serbia 
acquired its independent existence it has 
been a centre drawing! to itself the discon- 
tent and the ambitions of the Slav popju- 
lations under the Dual Monarchy. The 
realization of those ambitions implies the 
disruption of the Austro -Hungarian State. 



AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 37 

But behind the Southern Slavs stands Russia, 
and any attempt to change the pohtical 
status in the Balkans has thus meant, for 
years past, acute risk of war between the 
two Empires that border them. This 
political rivalry has accentuated the racial 
antagonism between German and Slav, and 
was the immediate origin of the war which 
presents itself to Englishmen as one 
primarily between Germany and the Western 
Powers. 

On the position of Italy it is not neces- 
sary to dwell. It had long been suspected 
that she was a doubtful factor in the Triple 
Alliance, and the event has pwroved that this 
suspicion was correct. But though Italy has 
participated in the war, her action had no 
part in producing it. And we need not here 
indicate the course and the motives of her 
policy . 

7. Germany. 

Having thus indicated briefly the posi- 
tion, the perils, and the ambitions of the 
other Great Powers of Europe, let us turn 
to consider the proper subject of this essay^ 
the policy of Germany. And first let us 



38 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 

dwell on the all -important fact that Ger- 
many, as a Great Power, is a creation of 
the last fifty years. Before 1866 there was 
a loose confederation of German States, 
after 1870 there was an Empire of the 
Gentians. The transformation was the work 
of Bismarck, and it was accomplished by 
"blood and iron." Whether it could have 
been accomplished otherwise is matter of 
speculation. That it was accomplished so 
is a fact, and a fact of tragic significance. 
For it established among Germans the pres- 
tige of force and fraud, and gave them as 
their national hero the man whose most 
characteristic act was the falsification of the 
Ems telegram. If the unification could 
have been achieved in 1848 instead of in 
1870, if the free and generous idealism of 
that epoch could have triumphed, as it 
deserved to, if Germans had not bartered 
away their souls for the sake of the king- 
dom of this world, we might have been spared 
this last and most terrible act in the bloody 
drama of European history. If even, after 
1866, 1870 had not been provoked, the 
catastrophe that is destroying Europe before 
our eyes might never have overwhelmed us. 
In the crisis of 1870 the French minister 



GERMANY 39 

who fought so long and with such tenacity, 
for peace saw and expressed, with the lucidity 
of his nation, what the real issue was for 
Germany and for Europe : — 

There exists, it is true, a barbarous Germany, greedy 
of battles and conquest, the Germany of the country 
squires ; there exists a Germany pharisaic and iniquitous, 
the Germany of all the unintelligible pedants whose 
empty lucubrations and microscopic researches have 
been so unduly vaunted. But these two Germanics are 
riot the great Germany, that of the artists, the poets, 
the thinkers, that of Bach, Mozart, Beethoven, Goethe, 
Schiller, Heine, Leibnitz, Kant, Hegel, Liebig. This 
latter Germany is good, generous, humane, pacific ; it 
finds expression in the touching phrase of Goethe, who 
when asked to write against us replied that he could 
not find it in his heart to hate the French. If we do 
not oppose the natural movement of German unity, if 
we allow it to complete itself quietly by successive 
stages, it will not give supremacy to the barbarous and 
sophistical Germany, it will assure it to the Germany of 
intellect and culture. War, on the other hand, would 
establish, during a time impossible to calculate, the 
domination of the Germany of the squires and the 
pedants.* 

The generous dream was not to be 
realized. French chauvinism fell into the 
trap Bismarck had prepared for it. Yet 

' Emile Ollivier, ** L'Empire Liberal." 



40 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY i 

even at the last moment his war would have 
escaped him had he not recaptured it by 
fraud. The publication of the Ems tele- 
gram made the conflict inevitable, and one 
of the most hideous and sinister scenes in 
all history is that in which the three con- 
spirators^ Bismarck, Moltke, and Roon, 
" suddenly recovered their pleasure in eating 
and drinking," because, by publishing a lie, 
they had secured the certain death in battle 
of hundreds and thousands of young men. 
The spirit of Bismarck has infected the whole 
public life of Germany and of Europe. It 
has given a new lease to the jxilitical phil- 
osophy of Machiavelli, and made of every 
budding statesman and historian a solemn 
or a cynical defender of the gospel of force. 
But, though this be true, we have no right 
therefore to assume that there is some 
peculiar wickedness which marks off Ger- 
man policy from that of all other nations. 
Machiavellianism is the common heritage of 
Europe. It is the translation into idea of 
the fact of international anarchy. Germans 
have been more candid and brutal than 
others in their expression and application 
of it, but statesmen, politicians, publicists, 
and historians in every nation accept it. 



GERMANY 1866-1890 41 

under a thicker or thinner veil of plausible 
sophisms. It is everywhere the iron hand 
within the silken glove. It is the great 
European tradition. 

Although, moreover, it was by these 
methods that Bismarck accomplished the 
unification of Germany, his later policy was, 
by common consent, a policy of peace. War 
had done its part, and the new Germany 
required all its energies to build up its in- 
ternal prosperity and strength. In 1875, 
it is true, Bismarck was credited with the 
intention to fall once more upon France. 
The fact does not seem to be clearly estab- 
lished. At any rate, if such was his inten- 
tion, it was frustrated by the intervention 
of Russia and of Great Britain. During the 
thirty-nine years that followed Germany kept 
the i>eace. 

While France, England, and Russia waged 
wars on a great scale, and while the former 
Powers acquired enormous extensions of 
territory, the only military operations under- 
taken by Germany were against African 
natives in her dependencies and against 
China in 1900. The conduct of the German 
troops appears, it is true, to have been 
distinguished, in this latter expedition, by 



42 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 

a brutality which stood out in reUef even in 
that orgy of slaughter and loot. But we 
must remember that they were specially 
ordered by their Imperial master, in the 
name of Jesus Christ, to show no mercy 
and give no quarter. Apart from this, it 
will not be disputed, by any one who knows 
the facts, that during the first twenty years 
or so after 1875 Germany was the Power 
whose diplomacy was the least disturbing to 
Europe. The chief friction during that period 
was between Russia and France and Great 
Britain, and it was one or other of these 
Powers, according to the angle of vision, 
which was regiarded as offering the menace 
of aggression. If there has been a German 
plot against the peace of the world, it does 
not date from before the decade 1890- 1900. 
The close of that decade marks, in fact, 
a new epoch in German policy. The years 
of peace had been distinguished by the 
development of industry and trade and 
internal organization. The population in- 
creased from forty millions in 1870 to 
over sixty-five millions at the present date. 
Foreign trade increased more than ten- 
fold. National pride and ambition grew 
with the growth of prosperity and force, and 



GERMANY 1890- 1900 43 

sentiment as well as need impelled German 
policy to claim a share of influence outside 
Europe in that greater world for the control 
of which the other nations were struggling. 
Already Bismarck, though with reluctance 
and scepticism, had acquired for his country 
by negotiation large areas in Africa. But 
that did not satisfy the ambitions of the 
colonial party. The new Kaiser put himself 
at the head of the new movement, and 
announced that henceforth nothing must 
be done in any part of the world with- 
out the cognizance and acquiescence of 
Germany . 

Thus there entered a new competitor upon 
the stage of the world, and his advent of 
necessity was disconcerting and annoying to 
the earlier comers. But is there reason to 
suppose that, from that moment, German 
policy was definitely aiming at empire, and 
was prepared to provoke war to achieve it ? 
Strictly, no answer can be given to this 
question. The remoter intentions of states- 
men are rarely avowed to others, and, 
perhaps, rarely to themselves. Their policy 
is, indeed, less continuous, less definite, and 
more at the mercy of events than observers 
or critics are apt to suppose. It is not prob- 



44 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 

able that Germany, any more than any other 
country in Europe, was pursuing during 
those years a definite plan, thought out and 
predetermined in every point. 

In Germany, as elsewhere, both in home 
and foreign affairs^, there was an intense and 
unceasing conflict of competing forces and 
ideas. In Germany, as elsewhere, policy 
must have adapted itself to circumstances, 
different personalities must have given it 
different directions at different times. We 
have not the information at our disposal 
which v/ould enable us to trace in detail 
the devious course of diplomacy in any of 
the countries of Europe. What we know 
something about is the general situation, 
and the action, in fact, taken at certain 
moments. The rest must be, for the present, 
mainly matter of conjecture. With this 
word of caution, let us now proceed to 
examine the policy of Germany. 

The general situation we have already 
indicated. We have shown how the armed 
peace, which is the chronic malady of Europe, 
had assumed during the ten years from 1904 
to 1 914 that specially dangerous form which 
grouped the Great Powers in two opposite 
camps— the Triple Alliance and the Triple 



GERMANY; 45 

Entente. We have seen^ in the case of 
Great Britain, France, Russia, and Austria- 
iHungary, how they came to take their 
places in that constellation. We have now 
to put Germany in its setting in the 
picture . 

Germany, then, in the first place, like the 
other Powers, had occasion to anticipate 
war. It might be made from the West, on 
the question of Alsace-Lorraine ; it might 
be made from the East, on the question of 
the Balkans. In either case, the system 
of alliances was likely to bring into play 
other States than those immediately in- 
volved, and the German Powers might find 
themselves attacked on all fronts, while they 
knew in the latter years that they could not 
count upon the support of Italy. 

A reasonable prudence, if nothing else, 
must keep Germany armed and apprehen- 
sive. But besides the maintenance of what 
she had, Germany was now ambitious to 
secure her share of " world -jx)wer." Let 
us examine in what spirit and by what acts 
she endeavoured to make her claim good. 

First, what was the tone of public opinion 
in Germany during these critical years ? 



46 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 



8. Opinion in Germany. 

Since the outbreak of the war the pamph- 
let Hterature in the countries of the Entente 
has been full of citations from German 
political writers. In England, in particular, 
the names and works of Bernhardi and of 
Treitschke have become more familiar than 
they appear to have been in Germany prior 
to the war. This method of selecting for 
polemical purposes certain tendencies of 
sentiment and theory, and ignoring all 
others, is one which could be applied, with 
damaging results, to any country in the 
world. Mr. Angell has shown in his 
" Prussianism in England " how it might be 
applied to ourselves ; and a German, no 
doubt, into whose hands that book might 
fall would draw conclusions about public 
opinion here similar to those which we have 
drawn about public opinion in Germany. 
There is jingoism in all countries, as there 
is pacifism in all countries. Nevertheless, 
I^thmJ^ Jl is true^^ t that the jingoism' 

of Germany has been peculiar both in its 
intensity and in its character. This special 
quality appears to be due both to the tem- 



OPINION IN GERMANY 47 

perament and to the recent history of the 
German nation. The Germans are romantic, 
as the French are impulsive, the English 
sentimental, and the Russians religious. 
There is some real meaning in these gener- 
alisations. They are easily to be felt when 
one comes into contact with a nation, though 
they may be hard to establish or define. 
When I say that the Germans are romantic, 
I mean that they do not easily or willingly 
see things as they are. Their temperament 
is like a medium of coloured glass. It 
magnifies, distorts, conceals, transmutes. 
And this is as true when their intel- 
lectual attitude is realistic as when it is 
idealistic. In the Germany of the past, the 
Germany of small States, to which all non- 
Germans look back with such sympathy and 
such regret, their thinkers and poets were 
inspired by grandiose intellectual abstrac- 
tions. They saw ideas, like gods, moving 
the world, and actual men and women, 
actual events and things, were but the pass- 
ing symbols of these supernatural powers ; 
1866 and 1870 ended all that. The unifi- 
cation of Germany, in the way we have 
discussed, diverted all their interest from 
speculation about the universe, life, and 



48 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 

mankind, to the material interests of their 
new country. Germany became the pre- 
occupation of all Germans. From abstrac- 
tions they turned with a new^ intoxication 
to what they conceived to be the concrete. 
Entering thus late upon the stage of national 
politics, they devoted themselves, with their 
accustomed thoroughness, to learning and 
bettering what they conceived to be the 
principles and the practice which had given 
success to other nations. In this quest no 
scruples should deter them, no sentimentality 
hamper, no universal ideals distract. Yet 
this, after all, was but German romanticism 
assuming another form. The objects, it is 
true, were different. " Actuality " had taken 
the place of ideals, Germany of Humanity. 
But by the German vision the new objects 
were no less distorted than the old. In 
dealing with " Real-politik " (which is the 
German translation of Machiavellianism), 
with " expansion," with " survival of the 
fittest," and all the other shibboleths of 
world - policy, their outlook remained as 
absolute and abstract as before, as con- 
temptuous of temperament and measure, as 
blind to those compromises and qualifica- 
tions, those decencies, so to speak, of nature. 



OPINION IN GERMANY 49 

by which reality is constituted. The Ger- 
mans now saw men instead of gods, but 
they saw them as trees walking. 

German imperialism, then, while it in- 
volves the same intellectual presuppositions, 
the same confusions, the same erroneous 
arguments, the same short-sighted ambi- * 
tions, as the imperialism of other countries, 
exhibits them all in an extreme degree. 
All peoples admire themselves. But the 
self-adoration of Germans is so naive, so 
frank, so unqualified, as to seem sheerly 
ridiculous to more experienced nations. ' 
The English and the French, too, believe 
their civilization to be the best in the world. 
But English common - sense and French 
sanity would prevent them from announcing 
to other peoples that they proposed to con- 

^ As I write: I come across the following, cited from a 
book of songs composed for German combatants under 
the title " Der deutsche Zorn " : — 

Wir sind die Meister aller Welt 
In alien ernsten Dingen, 

Was Man als fremd euch hochlichst preist 
Um eurer Einfalt Willen, 
1st deutschen Ursprungs allermeist, 
Und tragt nur fremde Hiillen. 

4 



50 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 

quer them, morally or materially, for their 
good. All Jingoes admire and desire war. 
But nowhere else in the modem world is 
to 'be found such a debauch of " romantic " 
enthusiasm, such a wilful blindness to all 
the realities of war, as Germany has mani- 
fested both before and since the out- 
break of this world-catastrophe. A reader 
of German newspapers and tracts gets at 
last a feeling of nausea at the very words 
Wir Deutsche, followed by the eternal 
Hetden, Heldenthum, Heldenthat, and is 
inclined to thank God if he indeed belong 
to a nation sane enough to be composed of 
Handler . 

The very antithesis between tielden 
(heroes) and Handier (hucksters), with 
which all Germany is ringing, is an illus- 
tration of the romantic quality that vitiates 
their intelligence. In spite of the fact that 
they are one of the greatest trading and 
manufacturing nations of the world, and that 
precisely the fear of losing their trade and 
markets has been, as they constantly assert, 
a chief cause that has driven them to war, 
they speak as though Germany were a kind 
of knight -errant, innocent of all material 
ambitions, wandering through the world 



OPINION IN GERMANY 51 

in the poire, disinterested service of God 
and man. On the other hand, because 
England is a great commercial Power, 
they suppose that no Englishman lives for 
anything but profit. Because they them- 
selves have conscription, and have to fight 
or be shot, they infer that every German 
is a noble warrior. Because the English 
volunteer, they assume that they only volun- 
teer for their pay. Germany, to them, is 
a hero clad in white armour, magnanimous, 
long-suffering, and invincible. Other nations 
are little seedy figures in black coats, in- 
spired exclusively by hatred and jealousy 
of the noble German, incapable of a generous 
emotion or an honourable act, and destined, 
by the judgment of history, to be saved, 
if they can be saved at all, by the great 
soul and dominating intellect of the Teuton. 
It is in this intoxicating atmosphere of 
temperament and mood that the ideas and 
ambitions of German imperialists work and 
move. They are essentially the same as 
those of imperialists in other countries. 
Their philosophy of history assumes an 
endless series of wars, due to the inevitable 
expansion of rival States. Their ethics means 
a belief in force and a disbelief in every- 



52 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 

thing else. Their science is a crude tnis- 
appHcation of Darwinism, combined with 
invincible ignorance of the true bearings of 
science upon life, and especially of those 
facts and deductions about biological 
heredity which, once they are understood, 
will make it plain that war degrades the 
stock of all nations, victorious and van- 
quished alike, and that the decline of civi- 
lizations is far more plausibly to be 
attributed to this cause than to the moral 
decadence of which history is always ready, 
after the event, to accuse the defeated Power. 
One peculiarity, perhaps, there is in the out- 
look of German imperialism, and that is its 
emphasis on an unintelligible and unreal 
abstraction of " race." Germans, it is 
thought, are by biological quality the salt 
of the earth. Every really great man in' 
Europe, since the break-up of the Roman 
Empire, has been a German, even though 
it might appear^, at first sight, to an unin- 
structed observer, that he was an Italian or a 
Frenchman or a Spaniard. Not all Germans, 
however, are, they hold, as yet included in 
the German Empire, or even in the German - 
Austrian combination. The Flemish are 
Germans, the Dutch are Germans, the 



OPINION IN GERMANY! 53 

English even are Germans, or were before 
the war had made them, in Germany's eyes, 
the off scouring of mankind. Thus, a great 
task lies before the German Empire : on 
the one hand, to bring within its fold the 
German stocks that have strayed from it 
in the wanderings of history ; on the other^ 
to reduce under German authority those 
other stocks that are not worthy to share 
directly in the citizenship of the Fatherland. 
The dreams of conquest which are the real 
essence of all imperialism are thus sup- 
ported in Germany by arguments peculiar 
to Germans. But the arguments put 
forward are not the real determinants of 
the attitude. The attitude, in any coun- 
try, whatever it may be called, rests at 
bottom on sheer national vanity. It 
is the belief in the inherent superiority 
of one's own civilization, and the desire to 
extend it, by force if need be, throughout 
the world. It matters little what arguments 
in its support this passion to dominate may 
garner from that twilight region in which 
the advanced guard of science is labouring 
patiently to comprehend Nature and man- 
kind. Men take from the treasury of truth 
what they are able to take. And what 



54 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 

imiperialists take is a mirror to their own 
ambition and pride. 

Now, as to the ambitions of this German 
jingoism there is no manner of doubt. Ger- 
mans are nothing if not frank. And this 
kind of German does want to conquer and 
annex, not only outside Europe but within 
it. We must not, however, infer that the 
whole of Germany has been infected with 
this virus. The summary I have set down 
in the last few pages represents the impres- 
sion made on an unsympathetic mind by the 
literature of Pangermanism . Emerging from 
such reading — and it is the principal read- 
ing of German origin which has been offered 
to the British public since the war— there is 
a momentary illusion, " That is Germany ! " 
Of course it is not, any more than the 
Morning Post or the National Review is 
England. Germans, in fact, during recent 
years have taken a prominent place in 
pacifism as well as in imperialism. Men 
like Schiicking and Quidde and Fried are at 
least as well known as men like Treitschke 
and Bernhardi. Opinion in Germany, as in 
every other country, has been various and 
conflicting. And the pacific tendencies have 
been better organized, if not more active. 



OPINION IN GERMANY 55 

there than elsewhere, for they have been 
associated with the huge and disciplined 
forces of the Social-Democrats. Indeed, the 
mass of the people, left alone, is everywhere 
pacific. I do not forget the very important 
fact that German education, elementary and 
higher, has been deliberately directed to 
inculcate patriotic feeling, that the doctrine 
of armed force as the highest manifestation 
of the State has been industriously propa- 
gated by the authorities, and that the 
unification of Germany by force has given 
to the cult of force a meaning and a 
popularity probably unknown in any other 
country. But in most men, for good or 
for evil, the lessons of education can be 
quickly obliterated by the experience of life. 
In particular, the mass of the people every- 
where, face to face wdth the necessities of 
existence, knowing what it is to work and 
to struggle, to co-operate and to compete, 
to suffer and to relieve suffering, though 
they may be less wxll -informed than the 
instructed classes, are also less liable to 
obsession by abstractions. They see little, 
but they see it straight. And though, being 
men, with the long animal inheritance of 
men behind them, their passions may be 



5 6 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 

roused by any cry of battle^ though they 
are the fore-ordained dupes of those who 
direct the poHcy of nations, yet it is not 
their initiative that originates wars. They 
do not desire conquest, they do not trouble 
about " race " or chatter about the '* survival 
of the fittest." It is their own needs, which 
are also the vital needs of society, that 
preoccupy their thoughts ; and it is real 
goods that direct and inspire their genuine 
idealism. 

We must, then, disabuse ourselves of the 
notion so naturally produced by reading, and 
especially by reading in time of war, that 
the German Jingoes are typical of Germany. 
They are there, they are a force, they 
have to be reckoned with. But exactly 
how great a force? Exactly how influential 
on policy ? That is a question which I 
imagine can only be answered by guesses. 
Would the reader, for instance, undertake 
to estimate the influence during the last 
fifteen years on British policy and opinion 
of the imperialist minority in this country? 
No two men, I think, would agree about it. 
And few men ^would agree with themselves 
from one day or one week to another. We 
are reduced to conjecture. But the con- 



OPINION ABOUT GERMANY 57 

jectures of some people are of more value 
than those of others, for they are based on 
a wider converse. J think it therefore not 
without importance to recall to the reader 
the accounts of the state of opinion in 
Germany given by well -qualified foreign 
observers in the years immediately preceding 
the war. 

9. Opinion about Germany. 

After the crisis of Agadir, M. Georges 
Bourdon visited Germany to make an in- 
quiry for the Figaro newspaper into the 
state of opinion there. His mission belongs 
to the period between Agadir and the out- 
break of the first Balkan war. He inter- 
viewed a large number of people, states- 
men, publicists, professors, politicians. He 
does not sum up his impressions, and such 
summary as I can give here is no doubt 
affected by the emphasis of my own mind. 
His book, I however, is now translated into 
English, and the reader has the opportunity 
of correcting the impression I give him. 

Let us begin with Pangermanism, on 
which M. Bourdon has a very interesting 

* *' L'Enigme AUeniande," 1914. 



58 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 

chapter. He feels for the propaganda of 
that sect the repulsion that must be felt 
by every sane and liberal-minded man :— 

Wretched, choleric Pangermans, exasperated and 
unbalanced, brothers of all the exasperated, wretched 
wmdbags whose tirades, in all countries, answer to 
yours, and whom you are wrong to count your enemies ! 
Pangermans of the Spree and the Main, who, on the 
other side of the frontier, receive the fraternal effusions 
of Russian Pan-Slavism, Italian irredentism, English 
imperialism, French nationalism ! What is it that 
you want ? 

They want, he replies, part of Austria, 
Switzerland, Flanders, Luxemburg, Den- 
mark, Holland, for all these are " Germanic " 
countries ! They want colonies. They want 
a bigger army and a bigger navy. " An 
execrable race, these Pangermans ! " " They 
have the yellow iskin, the dry mouth, the 
green complexion of the bilious. They do 
not live under the sky, they avoid the light. 
Hidden in their cellars, they pore over 
treaties, cite newspaper articles, grow pale 
over maps, measure angles, quibble over texts 
or traces of frontiers." '* The Pangerman 
is a propagandist and a revivalist." " But," 
M. Bourdon adds, " when he shouts we must 
not think we hear in his tones the reverber- 



OPINION ABOUT GERMANY 59 

ations of the German soul." The organs 
of the party seemed few and unimportant. 
The party itself was spoken of with contempt . 
" They talk loud," M. Bourdon was told, " but 
have no real following ; it is only in France 
that people attend to them." Nevertheless, 
M. Bourdon concluded they were not neglig- 
ible. For, in the first place, they have power 
to evoke the jingoism of the German public 
— a jingoism which the violent patriotism 
of the people, their tradition of victorious 
force, their education, their dogma of race, 
continually keep alive. And, secondly, the 
Government, when it thinks it useful, turns 
to the Pangermans for assistance, and 
lets loose their propaganda in the press. 
Their influence thus waxes and wanes, as 
it is favoured, or not, by authority. '* Like 
the giant Antaeus," a correspondent wrote 
to M. Bourdon, " Pangermanism loses its 
force when it quits the soil of government." 
It is interesting to note, however, that 
the Pangerman propaganda purports to be 
based upon fear. If they urge increased 
armaments, it is with a view to defence. 
** I considered it a patriotic duty," wrote 
General Keim, " in my quality of president 
of the German League for Defence, to 



6o THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 

demand an increase of effectives such that 
France should find it out of the question to 
dream of a victorious war against us, even 
with the help of other nations." " To the 
awakening of the national sentiment in 
France there is only one reply — the increase 
of the German forces." " *i have the impres- 
sion," said Count Reventlow, " that a war- 
like spirit which is new is developing in 
France. There is the danger." Thus in 
Germany, as elsewhere, even jingoism took 
the mask of necessary precaution. And 
so it must be, and will be everywhere, as 
long as the European anarchy continues. 
For what nation has ever admitted an in- 
tention or desire to make aggressive war? 
M. Bourdon, then, takes full account of 
Pangermanism . Nor does he neglect the 
general militaristic tendencies of German 
opinion. He found pride in the army, a 
determination to be strong, and that belief 
that it is in war that the State expresses 
itself at the highest and the best, which is 
part of the tradition of German education 
since the days of Treitschke. Yet, in spite 
of all this, to which M. Bourdon does full 
justice, the general impression made by the 
conversations he records is that the bulk 



OPINION ABOUT GERMANY 6i 

of opinion in Germany was strongly pacific. 
There was apprehension indeed, apprehen- 
sion of France and apprehension of England. 
" England certainly preoccupies opinion 
more than France. People are alarmed 
by her movements and her armaments." 
" The constant interventions of England 
have undoubtedly irritated the public." 
Germany, therefore, must arm and arm 
again. " A great war may be delayed, but 
not prevented, unless German armaments 
are such as to put fear into the heart of 
every possible adversary." 

Germany feared that war might come, but 
she did not want it— that, in sum, was M. 
Bourdon's impression. From soldiers, states- 
men, professors, business men, again and 
again, the same assurance. " The sentiment 
you will find most generally held is un- 
doubtedly that of peace." *' Few think about 
war. We need peace too much." "War! 
War between us ! What an idea ! Why, it 
would mean a European war, something 
monstrous, something which would surpass 
in horror anything the world has ever seen ! 
My dear sir, only madmen could desire or 
conceive such a calamity I It must be 
avoided at all costs." "What counts above 



62 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 

all here is commercial interest. All who 
live by it are, here as elsewhere, almost too 
pacific." "Under the economic conditions 
prevailing in Germany, the most glorious 
victory she can aspire to — it is a soldier 
who says it— is peace ! " 

The impression thus gathered from M. 
Bourdon's observations is confirmed at every 
point by those of Baron Beyens, who went 
to Berlin as Belgian minister after the crisis 
of Agadir.i Of the world of business he 
says :— 

All these gentlemen appeared to be convinced parti- 
sans of peace. . . . According to them, the tranquillity of 
Europe had not been for a moment seriously menaced 
during the crisis of Agadir. . . . Industrial Germany 
required to live on good terms with France. Peace 
was necessary to business, and German finance in 
particular had every interest in the maintenance of its 
profitable relations virith French finance.^ At the end 
of a few months I had the impression that these 

^ See " L'Allemagne avant la guerre,'^ pp. 97 seq. 
and 170 seq. Bruxelles, 1915. 

2 A Frenchman, M. Maurice Ajam, who made an 
inquiry among business men in 1913 came to the same 
conclusion. *' Peace 1 I write that all the Germans 
without exception, when they belong to the world of 
business, are fanatical partisans of the maintenance 
of European peace." See Yves Guyot, " Les causes et 
les consequences de la guerre," p. 226. 



OPINION ABOUT GERMANY 63 

pacifists personified then — in 19 12 — the most common, 
the most widely spread, though the least noisy, opinion, 
the opinion of the majority, understanding by the 
majority, not that of the governing classes but that 
of the nation as a whole (p. 172). 

The mass of the people, Beyens held, loved 
peace, and dreaded war. That was the case, 
not only with all the common people, but 
also with the managers and owners of 
businesses and the wholesale and retail 
merchants. Even in Berlin society and 
among the ancient German nobility there 
were to be found sincere pacifists. On 
the other hand, there was certainly a belli- 
cose minority. It was composed largely 
of soldiers, both active and retired ; the 
latter especially looking with envy and dis- 
gust on the increasing prosperity of the 
commercial classes, and holding that a 
" blood-letting would be wholesome to purge 
and regenerate the social body " — a view not 
confined to Germany, and one which has 
received classical expression in Tennyson's 
" Maud." To this movement belonged also 
the high officials, the Conservative parties, 
patriots and journalists, and of course the 
armament firms, deliberate fomenters of war 
in Germany, as everywhere else, in order to 



64 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 

put money into their pockets. To these must 
be added the " intellectual flower of the 
universities and the schools." "The pro- 
fessors at the universities, taken en bloc, 
were one of the most violent elements in 
the nation." " Almost all the young people 
from one end of the Empire to the other 
have had brought before them in the course 
of their studies the dilemma which Bem- 
hardi summed up to his readers in the three 
words ' world-power or decadence.' Yet 
with all this, the resolute partisans of war 
formed as I thought a very small minority 
in the nation. That is the impression I 
obstinately retain of my sojourn in Berlin 
and my excursions into the provinces of the 
Empire, rich or poor. When I recall the 
image of this peaceful population, journey- 
ing to business every week-day with a 
movement so regular, or seated at table on 
Sundays in the cafes in the open air before 
a glass of beer, I can find in my memories 
nothing but placid faces where there was 
no trace of violent passions, no thought 
hostile to foreigners, not even that feverish 
concern with the struggle for existence which 
the spectacle of the human crowd has 
sometimes shown me elsewhere." 



OPINION ABOUT GERMANY 65 

A similar impression is given by the 
dispatch from M. Cambon, French Ambas- 
sador to Berhn, written on July 30, 1913.^ 
He, too, finds elements working for war, and 
analyses them much as Baron Beyens does. 
There are first the " junkers," or country 
squires, naturally military by all their tradi- 
tions, but also afraid of the death-duties 
" which are bound to come if peace con- 
tinues." Secondly, the "higher bour- 
geoisie "—that is, the great manufacturers 
and financiers, and, of course, in particular 
the armament firms. Both these social 
classes are influenced, not only by direct 
pecuniary motives but by the fear of the 
rising democracy, which is beginning to 
swamp their representatives in the Reich- 
stag. Thirdly, the ofiicials, the " party of 
the pensioned." Fourthly, the universities, 
the *' historians, philosophers, political 
pamphleteers, and other apologists of 
German Kultur." Fifthly, rancorous diplo- 
matists, with a sense that they had been 
duped. On the other hand, there were, as 
M. Cambon insists, other forces in the 
country making for peace. What were 
these? In numbers the great bulk, in 
^ See French Yellow, Book, No. 5. 
5 



66 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 

Germany as in all countries. '* The mass 
of the workmen, artisans and peasants, who 
are peace-loving by instinct." Such of the 
great nobles as were intelligent enough to 
recognize the '* disastrous political and social 
consequences of war." '* Numerous manu- 
facturers, merchants, and financiers in a 
moderate way of business." The non- 
German elements of the Empire. Einally, 
the Government and the governing classes 
in the large southern States. A goodly 
array of peace forces ! According to M. 
Cambon, however, all these latter elements 
*' are only a sort of make-weight in political 
matters with limited influence on public 
opinion, or they are silent social forces, 
passive and defenceless against the infection 
of a wave of warlike feeling." This last 
sentence is pregnant. It describes the state 
of affairs existing, more or less, in all coun- 
tries ; a few individuals, a few groups or 
cliques, making for war more or less de- 
liberately ; the mass of the people ignorant 
and unconcerned, but also defenceless 
against suggestion, and ready to respond to 
the call to war, with submission or with 
enthusiasm, as soon as the call is made by 
their Government. 



OPINION ABOUT GERMANY 67 

On the testimony, then, of these witnesses, 
all shrewd and competent observers, it may- 
be j>ermitted to sum up somewhat as 
follows :— 

In the years immediately preceding the 
war the mass of the people in Germany, 
rich and poor, were attached to peace and 
dreaded war. But there was there also a 
powerful minority either desiring war or 
expecting it, and, in either case, preparing 
it by their agitation. And this minority 
could appeal to the peculiarly aggressive 
form of patriotism inculcated by the public 
schools and universities. The war party 
based its appeal for ever fresh armaments 
on the hostile preparations of the Powers of 
the Entente. Its aggressive ambition mas- 
queraded, perhaps even to itself, as a patriot- 
ism apprehensively concerned with defence. 
It was supi>orted by powerful moneyed 
interests , and the mass of the people, 
passive, ill-informed, preoccupied, were 
defenceless against its agitation. The 
German Government found the Pangermans 
embarrassing or convenient according as 
the direction of its policy and the Euro- 
pean situation changed from crisis to crisis. 
They were thus at one moment negligible. 



68 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 

at another powerful. For long they agitated 
vainly, and they might long have continued 
to do so. But if the moment should come 
at which the Government should make the 
fatal plunge, their efforts would have con- 
tributed to the result, their warnings would 
seem to have been justified, and they would 
triumph as the party of patriots that had 
foretold in vain the coming crash to an 
unbelieving nation. 



ID. German Policy^ from 1890-1900. 

Having thus examined the atmosphere of 
opinion in which the German Government 
moved, let us proceed to consider the actual 
course of their policy during the critical 
^ears, fifteen or so, that preceded the war. 
The policy admittedly and openly was one 
of "expansion." But ''expansion" where? 
It seems to be rather widely supposed that 
Germany was preparing war in order to 
annex territory in Europe. The contempt 
of German imperialists, from Treitschke 
onward, for the rights of small States, the 
racial theories which included in " German " 
territory Holland, Belgium', Switzerland, and 



GERMANY FROM 1890-1900 69 

the Scandinavian countries, may seem to give 
colour to this idea. But it would be 
hazardous to assume that German statesmen 
were seriously, influenced for years by the 
lucubrations of Mr. Houston Stewart 
Chamberlain and his follow^ers. Nor can 
a long-prepared policy of annexation in 
Europe be inferred from the fact that 
Belgium and France were invaded after the 
war broke out, or even from the present 
demand among German parties that the 
territories occupied should be retained. If 
it could be maintained that the seizure of 
territory during war, or even its retention 
after it, is evidence that the territory was 
the object of the war, it would be legiti- 
mate also to infer that the British Empire 
has gone to war to annex German colonies, 
a conclusion which Englishmen would prob- 
ably reject with indignation. In truth, 
before the war, the view that it was the 
object of German policy to annex European 
territory would have found, I think, few, 
if any, supf>orters among well-informed and 
unprejudiced observers. I note, for instance, 
that Mr. Dawson, whose opinion on such a 
point is probably better worth having than 
that of any other Englishmaji, in his book. 



JO THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 

" The Evolution of Modern Germany," ^ 
when discussing the aims of German policy 
does not even refer to the idea that annexa- 
tions in Europe are contemplated. 

So far as the evidence at present goes, 
I do not think a case can be made out for 
the view that German policy was aiming 
during these years at securing the hegemony 
of Europe by annexing European territory. 
The expansion Germany was seeking was 
that of trade and markets. And her states- 
men and people, like those of other coun- 
tries, were under the belief that, to secure 
this, it was necessary to acquire colonies. 
This ambition, up to a point, she was able, 
in fact, to fulfil, not by force but by agree- 
ment with the other Powers. The Berlin 
Act of 1885 was one of the v/isest and most 
far-seeing achievements of European pK)licy. 
By it the partition of a great part of the 
African continent between the Powers was 
peaceably accomplished, and Germany 
emerged with possessions to the extent 
of '^77>^^^ square miles and an estimated 
population of 1,700,000. By 1906 her 
colonial domain had been increased to over 
two and a half million square miles, and 

' Published in 1908. 



GERMANY FROM 1890- 1900 71 

its population to over twelve millions ; and 
all of this had been acquired without war 
with any. civilized nation. In spite of her 
late arrival on the scene as a colonial Power, 
Germany had thus secured without war an 
empire overseas, not comparable, indeed, to 
that of Great Britain or of France, but still 
considerable in extent and (as Germans 
believed) in economic promise, and sufficient 
to give them the opportunity they desired 
to show their capacity as pioneers of civi- 
lization. How they have succeeded or failed 
in this we need not here consider. But 
when Germans demand a " place in the 
sun," the considerable place they have in 
fact acquired, with the acquiescence of the 
other colonial Powers, should, in fairness to 
those Powers, be remembered. But, notori- 
ously, they were not satisfied, and the extent 
of their dissatisfaction was shown by their 
determination to create a navy. This new 
departure, dating from the close of the 
decade 1890- 1900, marks the beginning of 
that friction between Great Britain and 
Germany which was a main cause of the 
war. It is therefore important to form some 
just idea of the motives that inspired German 
policy, to take this momentous step. The 



72 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 



1 



reasons given by Prince Biilow, the founder 
of the policy, and often repeated by German 
statesmen and publicists/ are, first, the need 
of a strong navy to protect German com- 
merce ; secondly, the need, as well as the 
ambition, of Germany to play a part propor- 
tional to her real strength in the determina- 
tion of policy beyond the seas. These 
reasons, according to the ideas that govern 
European statesmanship, are valid and 
sufficient. They are the same that have in- 
fluenced all great Powers ; and if Germany 
was influenced by them we need not infer 
any specially sinister intentions on her part. 
The fact that during the present war Ger- 
man trade has been swept from the seas, 
and that she is in the position of a blockaded 
Power, will certainly convince any German 
patriot, not that she did not need a navy, 
but that she needed a much stronger one ; 
and the retort that there need have been 
no war if Germany had not provoked it by 
building a fleet is not one that can be ex- 
pected to appeal to any nation so long as 
the European anarchy endures. For, of 
course, every nation regards itself as 

* See, e.g., Dawson, '' Evolution of Modern Ger- 
many," p. 348. 



GERMANY FROM 1890- 1900 73 

menaced perpetually by aggression from 
some other Power. Defence was certainly 
a legitimate motive for the building of the 
fleet, even if there had been no other. 
There was, however, in fact, another reason 
avowed. Germany, as we have said, desired 
to have a voice in policy beyond the seas. 
Here, too, the reason is good, as reasons go 
in a world of competing States. A great 
manufacturing and trading Power cannot be 
indifferent to the parcelling out of the world 
among its rivals. Wherever, in countries 
economically undeveloped, there were pro- 
jects of protectorates or annexations, or of 
any kind of monopoly to be established in 
the interest of any Power, there German 
interests were directly affected. She had 
to speak, and to speak with a loud voice, 
if she was to be attended to. And a loud 
voice meant a navy. So, at least, the matter 
naturally presented itself to German im- 
perialists, as, indeed, it would to imperial- 
ists of any other country. 

The reasons given by German statesmen 
for building their fleet were in this sense 
valid. But were they the only reasons? In 
the beginning most probably they were. But 
the formation and strengthening of the 



74 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 

Entfente, and Germany's consequent fear that 
war might be made upon her jointly, by 
France and Great Britain^ gave a new 
stimulus to her naval ambition. She could 
not now be content with a navy only as 
big as that of France^ for she might have 
to meet those of France and England con- 
joined. This defensive reason is good. But 
no doubt, as always, there must have lurked 
behind it ideas of aggression. Ambition, in 
the philosophy of States, goes hand in hand 
with fear. " The war may come," says one 
party. '* Yes," says the other ; and secretly 
mutters, '' May the war come I " To ask 
whether armaments are for offence or for 
defence must always be an idle inquiry. 
They will be for either, or both, according 
to circumstances^ according to the per- 
sonalities that are in power, according to 
the mood that politicians and journalists, 
and the interests that suborn them, have 
been able to infuse into a nation. But what 
may be said with clear conviction is, that 
to attempt to account for the clash of war 
by the ambition and armaments of a single 
Power is to think far too simply of how 
these catastrophes originate. The truth, 
in this case, is that German ambition 



GERMANY FROM 1890- 1900 7 5 

developed in relation to the whole Euro- 
pean situation, and that, just as on land 
their policy was conditioned by their rela- 
tion to France and Russia, so at sea it was 
conditioned by their relation to Great 
Britain. They knew that their determina- 
tion to become a great Power at sea would 
arouse the suspicion and alarm of the 
English. Prince Blilow is perfectly frank 
about that. He says that the difficulty was 
to get on with the shipbuilding programme 
without giving Great Britain an opportunity 
to intervene by force and nip the enterprise 
in the bud. He attributes here to the 
British Government a policy which is all in 
the Bismarckian tradition. It was, in fact, 
a policy urged by some voices here, voices 
which, as is always the case, were carried 
to Germany and magnified by the mega- 
phone of the Press. I That no British 
Government, in fact, contemplated picking 
a quarrel with Germany in order to prevent 
her becoming a naval Power I am myself 
as much convinced as any other English- 
man, and I count the fact as righteousness 
to our statesmen. On the other hand, I 

^ Some of these are cited in Billow's " Imperial 
Germany," p. 36. 



76 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 

think it an unfounded conjecture that Prince 
Billow was dehberately building with a 
view to attacking the British Empire. I 
see no reason to doubt his sincerity when 
he says that he looked forward to a peaceful 
solution of the rivalry between Germany and 
ourselves, and that Erance;, in his view, not 
Great Britain, was the irreconcilable enemy. ^ 
In building her navy, no doubt, Germany 
deliberately took the risk of incurring a 
quarrel with England in the pursuit of a 
policy which she regarded as essential to 
her development. It is quite another 
thing, and would require much evidence 
to prove that she was working up to a 
war with the object of destroying the 
British Empire. 

What we have to bear in mind, in esti- 
mating the meaning of the German naval 
pK)licy, is a complex series of motives and 
conditions : the genuine need of a navy, and 
a strong one, to protect trade in the event 
of war, and to secure a voice in over- 
seas policy ; the genuine fear of an attack 
by the Powers of the Entente^ an attack to 
be provoked by British jealousy ; and also 

' See ^' Imperial Germany," pp. 48, 71, English 
translation. 



ATTEMPTS AT HARMONY n 

that indeterminate ambition of any great 
Power which may be influencing the poHcy 
of statesmen even while they have not 
avowed it to themselves, and which, ex- 
pressed by men less responsible and less 
discreet, becomes part of that " public 
opinion " of which policy takes account. 

1 1 . Vain Attempts at Harmony,. 

It may, however, be reasonably urged 
that unless the Germans had had aggressive 
ambitions they would have agreed to some 
of the many proposals made by Great 
Britain to arrest on both sides the constantly 
expanding programmes of naval construc- 
tions. It is true that Germany has always 
opposed the policy of limiting armaments, 
whether on land or sea. This is consonant 
with that whole militarist view of inter- 
national politics which, as I have already 
indicated, is held in a more extreme and 
violent form in Germany than in any other 
country, but which is the creed of jingoes 
and imperialists everywhere. If the British 
Government had succeeded in coming to an 
agreement with Germany on this question, 
they would have been bitterly assailed by 



yS THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 

that party at home. Still, the Government 
did make the attempt. It was compara- 
tively easy for them, for any basis to which 
they could have agreed must have left 
intact, legitimately and necessarily, as we 
all agree, the British supremacy at sea. The 
Germans would not assent to this. They 
did not choose to limit beforehand their 
efforts to rival us at sea. Probably they 
did not think it possible to equal, still less 
to outstrip us. But they wanted to do 
all they could. And that of course could 
have only one meaning. They thought 
a war with England possible, and they 
wanted to be as well prepared as they could 
be. It is part of the irony that attaches 
to the whole system of the armed peace 
that the preparations made against war are 
themselves the principal cause of war. For 
if there had been no rival shipbuilding, 
there need have been no friction between 
the two countries. 

"But why did Germany fear war ? It 
must have been because she meant to make 
it." So the English argue. But imagine 
the Germans saying to us, " Why do you 
fear war? There will be no war unless 
you provoke it. We are quite pacific. You 



AITEMPTS AT HARMONY 79 

need not be alarmed about us." Would 
such a promise have induced us to relax 
our preparations for a moment ? No ! Under 
the armed peace there can be no con- 
fidence. And that alone is sufficient to 
account for the breakdown of the Anglo - 
German negotiations, without supposing on 
either side a wish or an intention to make 
war. Each suspected, and was bound to 
suspect, the purpose of the other. Let 
us take, for example, the negotiations 
of 1 9 1 2, and put them back in their 
setting . 

The Triple Alliance was confronting the 
Triple Entente. On both sides were fear and 
suspicion. Each believed in the possibility 
of the others springing a war upon them. 
Each suspected the others of wanting to lull 
them into a false security, and then take them 
unprepared. In that atmosphere, what hope 
was there of successful negotiations ? The 
essential condition — mutual confidence— was 
lacking. What, accordingly, do we find? 
The Germans offer to reduce their naval 
programme, first, if England will promise 
an unconditional neutrality ; secondly, when 
that was rejected, if England will promise 
neutrality in a war which should be " forced 



8o THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 

upon " Germany. Thereupon the British 
Foreign Office scents a snare. Germany will 
get Austria to provoke a war, while making 
it appear that the war was provoked by 
Russia, and she will then come in under 
the terms of her alliance with Austria, smash 
France, and claim that England must look 
on passively under the neutrality agreement ! 
'* No, thank you ! " Sir Edward Grey, 
accordingly, makes a counter-proposal. 
England will neither make nor participate 
in an "unprovoked" attack upon Germany. 
This time it is the German Chancellor's 
turn %p hang back. " Unprovoked ! Hm ! 
What does !that mean? Russia, let us sup- 
pose, makes war upon Austria, while making 
it appear that Austria is the aggressor. 
France comes in on the side of Russia. 
And England? Will she admit that the 
war was ' unprovoked ' and remain neutral? 
Hardly, we think ! " The Chancellor there- 
upon proposes the addition : " England, of 
course, will remain neutral if war is forced 
upon Germany? That follows, I presume?" 
" No 1 " from the British Foreign Office. 
Reason as before. And the negotiations 
fall through. How should they not under 
the conditions ? There could be no under- 



ATTEMPTS AT HARMONY 8i 

standing, because there was no confidence. 
There could be no confidence because there 
was mutual fear. There was mutual fear 
because the Triple Alliance stood in arms 
against the Triple Entente. What was 
wrong? Germany? England? No. The 
European tradition and system. 

The fact, then, that those negotiations 
broke down is no more evidence of sinister 
intentions on the part of Germany than it 
is on the part of Great Britain. Baron 
Beyens, to my mind the most competent and 
the most impartial, as well as one of the 
best -informed, of those who have written 
on the events leading up to the war, says 
explicitly of the policy of the German 
Chancellor :— 



A practicable rapprochement between his country 
and Great Britain was the dream with which M. de 
Bethmann-Hollweg most wiUingly soothed himself, 
without the treacherous arriere-pensee which the 
Prince von Biilow perhaps would have had of finish- 
ing later on, at an opportune moment, with the British 
Navy. Nothing authorizes us to believe that there was 
not a basis of sincerity in the language of M. de Jagow 
when he expressed to Sir E. Goschen in the course 
of their last painful interview his poignant regret at 
the crumbling of his entire policy and that of the 

6 



82 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 

Chancellor, which had been to make friends with 
Great Britain, and then through Great Britain to get 
closer to France.^ 



Meantime the considerations I have here 
laid before the reader, in relation to this 
general question of Anglo -German rivalry, 
are, I submit, all relevant, and must be 
taken into fair consideration in forming a 
judgment. The facts show clearly that 
Germany was challenging as well as she 
could the British supremacy at sea ; that she 
was determined to become a naval as well 
as a military Power ; and that her policy 
was, on the face of it, a menace to this 
country ; just as the creation on our part 
of a great conscript army would have been 
taken by Germany as a menace to her. 
The British Government was bound to make 
counter -preparations. I, for my own part, 
have never disputed it. I have never 
thought, and do not now think, that while 
the European anarchy continues, a single 
Power can disarm in the face of the others. 
All this is beyond dispute. What is dis- 
putable, and a matter of speculative in- 

^ '* L'Allemagne avant la guerre," p. 75, and British 
White Paper, No. 160. 



ATTEMPTS AT HARMONY 83 

ference, is the further assumption that in 
pursuing this poHcy Germany was making 
a bid to destroy the British Empire. The 
facts can certainly be accounted for with- 
out that assumption. I myself think the 
assumption highly improbable. So much I 
may say, but I cannot say more. Possibly 
some day we may be able to check con- 
jecture by facts. Until then, argument 
must be inconclusive. 

This question of the naval rivalry between 
Germany and Great Britain is, however, part 
of the general question of militarism. And 
it may be urged that while during the last 
fifteen years the British Government has 
shown itself favourable to projects of arbi- 
tration and of limitation of armaments, 
the German Government has consistently 
opposed them. There is much truth in 
this ; and it is a good illustration of what 
I hold to be indisputable, that the militaristic 
view of international politics is much more 
deeply rooted in Germany than in Great 
Britain. It is worth while, however, to 
remind ourselves a little in detail what the 
facts were since they are often misrepre- 
sented or exaggerated. 

The question of international arbitration 



84 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 

was brought forward at the first Hague 
Conference in 1 899.1 From the beginning 
it was recognized on all sides that it would 
be idle to propose general compulsory arbi- 
tration for all subjects. No Power would 
have agreed to it, not Great Britain or 
America any more than Germany. On 
the other hand, projects for creating an 
arbitration tribunal, to which nations willing 
to use it should have recourse, were brought 
forward by both the British and the Ameri- 
can representatives. From the beginning, 
however, it became clear that Count Miinster, 
the head of the German delegation, was 
opposed to any scheme for encouraging, 
arbitration. ** He did not say that he would 
oppose a moderate plan of voluntary arbi- 
tration, but he insisted that arbitration 
must be injurious to Germany ; that Ger- 
many is prepared for war as no other coun- 
try is, or can be ; that she can mobilize 
her army in ten days ; and that neither 
France, Russia, nor any other Power can 
do this. Arbitration, he said, would simply 

^ The account that follows is taken from the '* Auto- 
biography '^ of Andrew D. White, the chairman of the 
American delegation. See vol. ii., chap. xlv. and 
following. 



ATTEMPTS AT HARMONY 85 

give rival Powers time to put themselves 
in readiness, and would, therefore, be a 
great disadvantage to Germany." Here is 
what I should call the militarist view in all 
its simplicity and purity, the obstinate, 
unquestioning belief that war is inevitable, 
and the determination to be ready for it 
at all costs, even at the cost of rejecting 
machinery which if adopted might obviate 
war. The passage has often been cited as 
evidence of the German determination to 
have war. But I have not so often seen 
quoted the exactly parallel declaration made 
by Sir John (now Lord) Fisher. *' He said 
that the Navy of Great Britain was and 
would remain in a state of complete prepara- 
tion for war ; that a vast deal depended 
on prompt action by the Navy ; and that 
the truce afforded by arbitration proceed- 
ings would give other Powers time, which 
they would not otherwise have, to put them- 
selves into complete readiness." ^ So far 
the *' militarist " and the *' marinist " adopt 

^ Mr. Arthur Lee, late Civil Lord of the Admiralty, 
at Eastleigh : — 

*' If war should unhappily break out under existing 
conditions the British Navy would get its blow in 
first, before the other nation had time even to read 



86 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 

exactly the same view. And we may be 
sure that if proposals are made after the 
war to strengthen the machinery for inter- 
national arbitration, there will be opposition 
in this country of the same kind, and based 
on the same grounds, as the opjx)sition in 
Germany. We cannot on this point condemn 
Count Miinster without also condemning 
Lord Fisher. 

Miinster's opposition, however, was only the 
beginning. As the days went on it became 
clear that the Kaiser himself had become 
actively opposed to the whole idea of arbitra- 
tion, and was influencing Austria and Italy 
and Turkey in that sense. The delegates of 
all the other countries were in favour of the 
very mild application of it which was under 
consideration. So, however, be it noted, 
were all the delegates from' Germany, ex- 
cept Count Miinster. And even he was, 
by now, so far converted that when orders 
were received from Germany definitely to 

in the papers that war had been declared " {Th£ 
Times, February 4, 1905). 

" The British fleet is now prepared strategically for 
every possible emergency, for we must assume that all 
foreign naval Powers are possible enemies " (The Times, 
February 7, 1905). 



ATTEMPTS AT HARMONY 87 

refuse co-operation, he postponed the critical 
sitting of the committee, and dispatched 
Professor Zorn to Berhn to lay the whole 
matter before the Chancellor. Professor 
Zorn was accompanied by the American 
Dr. Holls, bearing an urgent private letter 
to Prince Hohenlohe from Mr. White. The 
result was that the German attitude was 
changed, and the arbitration tribunal was 
finally established with the consent and co- 
operation of the German Government. 

I have thought it worth while to dwell 
thus fully upon this episode because it illus- 
trates how misleading it really is to talk of 
" Germany *' and the *' German " attitude. 
There is every kind of German attitude. 
The Kaiser is an unstable and changeable 
character. His ministers do not necessarily 
agree with him, and he does not always 
get his way. As a consequence of discus- 
sion and persuasion the German opposition, 
on this occasion, was overcome. There was 
nothing, in fact, fixed and final about it. It 
was the militarist prejudice, and the prejudice 
this time yielded to humanity and reason. 

The subject was taken up again in the 
Conference of 1907, and once more Ger- 
many was in opposition. The German dele- 



88 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 

gate, Baron Marschall von Bieberstein, while 
he was not against compoilsory arbitration 
for certain selected topics, was opposed to 
any general treaty. It seems clear that it 
was this attitude of Germany that prevented 
any advance being made beyond the Con- 
vention of 1899. Good reasons, of course, 
could be given for this attitude ; but they 
are the kind of reasons that goodwill could 
have surmounted. It seems clear that there 
was goodwill in other Governments, but not 
in that of Germany, and the latter lies legiti- 
mately under the prejudice resulting from' 
the position she then took, German critics 
have recognized this as freely as critics of 
other countries. I myself feel no desire to 
minimize the blame that attaches to Ger- 
many. But Englishmen who criticize her 
policy must always ask themselves whether 
they would support a British Government 
that should stand for a general treaty of 
compulsory arbitration. 

On the question of limitation of arma- 
ments the German Government has been 
equally intransigeant . At the Conference 
of 1899, indeed, no serious effort was made 
by any Power to achieve the avowed purpose 
of the meeting. And, clearly, if anything 



ATTEMPTS AT HARMONY 89 

was intended to be done^ the wrong direc- 
tion was taken from the beginning. When 
the second Conference was to meet it is 
understood that the German Government 
refused participation if the question of 
armaments was to be discussed, and the 
subject did not appear on the official pro- 
gramme. Nevertheless the British^ French, 
and American delegates took occasion to 
express a strong sense of the burden of arma- 
ments, and the urgent need of lessening it. 
The records of the Hague Conferences 
do, then, clearly show that the German 
Government was more obstinately sceptical 
of any advance in the direction of inter- 
national arbitration or disarmament than 
that of any other Great Power, and especi- 
ally of Great Britain or the United States. 
Whether, in fact, much could or would have 
been done^ even in the absence of German 
opposition, may be doubted. There would 
certainly have been, in every country, very 
strong opposition to any effective measures, 
and it is only those who would be willing 
to see their own Government make a radical 
advance in the directions in question who 
can honestly attack the German Govern- 
ment. As one of those who believe that 



90 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 

peaceable procedure may and can, and, if 
civilization is to be preserved, must be sub- 
stituted for war, I have a right to express 
my own condemnation of the German 
Government, and I unhesitatingly do so. 
But I do not infer that therefore Germany 
was all the time working up to an agglres- 
sive war. It is interesting, in this connec- 
tion^ to note the testimony given by Sir 
Edwin Pears to the desire for good relations 
between Great Britain and Germany felt and 
expressed later by the same Baron Marschall 
von Bieberstein who was so unyielding in 
1907 on the question of arbitration. When 
he came to take up the post of German 
Ambassador to Great Britain, Sir Edwin 
reports him as saying : — 

I have long wanted to be Ambassador to England, 
because, as you know, for years I have considered it a 
misfortune to the world that our two countries are not 
really in harmony. I consider that I am here as a 
man with a mission, my mission being to bring about 
a real understanding between our two nations. 

On this Sir Edwin comtnents ( 1 9 1 5 ) :— 

I unhesitatingly add that I am convinced he was 
sincere in what he said. Of that I have no doubt. ^ 

' Sir Edwin Pears, " Forty Years in Constantinople," 
P- 330- 



ATTEMPTS AT HARMONY 91 

It must, in fact, be recognized that in 
the present state of international relations, 
the general suspicion and the imminent 
danger, it requires more imagination and 
faith than most public men possess, and 
more idealism than most nations have shown 
themselves to be capable of, to take any 
radical step towards reorganization. The 
armed peace, as we have so often had to 
insist, perpetuates itself by the mistrust 
which it establishes. 

Every move by one Power is taken to be 
a menace to another, and is coimtered by 
a similar move, which in turn produces a 
reply. And it is not easy to say ** Who 
began it?" since the rivalry goes so far 
back into the past. What, for instance, is 
the real truth about the German, French, 
and Russian military laws of 1 9 1 3 ? Were 
any or all of them aggressive? Or were 
they all defensive? I do not believe it is 
possible to answer that question. Looking 
back from the point of view of 1914, it is 
natural to suppose that Germany was already 
intending war. But that did not seem evi- 
dent at the time to a neutral observer, nor 
even, it would seem, to the British Eoreign 
Office. Thus the Count de Lalaing, Belgian 



92 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 

Minister in London, writes as follows on 
February 24, 1 9 1 3 :— 

The English Press naturally wants to throw upon 
Germany the responsibility for the new tension which 
results from its proposals, and which may bring to 
Europe fresh occasions of unrest. Many journals 
consider that the French Government, in declaring 
itself ready to impose three years' service, and in 
nominating M. Delcasse to St. Petersburg, has adopted 
the only attitude worthy of the great Republic in 
presence of a German provocation. At the Foreign 
Office I found a more just and calm appreciation of 
the position. They see in the reinforcement of the 
German armies less a provocation than the admission 
of a military situation weakened by events and which 
it is necessary to strengthen. The Government of 
Berlin sees itself obliged to recognize that it cannot 
count, as before, on the support of all the forces of 
its Austrian ally, since the appearance in South-east 
Europe of a new Power, that of the Balkan allies, 
established on the very flank of the Dual Empire. Far 
from being able to count, in case of need, on the full 
support of the Government of Vienna, it is probable 
that Germany will have to support Vienna herself. In 
the case of a European war she would have to make 
head against her enemies on two frontiers, the Russian 
and the French, and diminish perhaps her own forces 
to aid the Austrian army. In these conditions they 
do not find it surprising that the German Empire 
should have felt it necessary to increase the num- 
ber of its Army Corps. They add at the Foreign Office 



ATTEMPTS AT HARMONY 93 

that the Government of Berlin had frankly explained 
to the Cabinet of Paris the precise motives of its action. 

Whether this is a complete account of 
the motives of the German Government in 
introducing the law of 19 13 cannot be 
definitely established. But the motives sug- 
gested are adequate by themselves to account 
for the facts. On the other hand^ a part of 
the cost of the new law was to be defrayed 
by a tax on capital. And those who believe 
that by this year Germany was definitely 
waiting an occasion to make war have a 
right to dwell upon that fact. I find, myself, 
nothing conclusive in these speculations. 
But what is certain, and to my mind much 
more important, is the fact that military pre- 
parations evoke counter-preparations, until 
at last the strain becomes unbearable. By 
1 9 13 it was already terrific. The Germans 
knew well that by January 19 17 the Erench 
and Russian preparations would have 
reached their culminating point. But those 
preparations were themselves almost unen- 
durable to the Erench. 

I may recall here the passage already 
cited from a dispatch of Baron Guillaume, 
Belgian Ambassador at Paris_, written 
in June 1914 (p. 34). 'He suspected, as we 



94 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 

saw^ that the hand of Russia had imposed 
the three years' service upon France. 

What Baron Guillaume thought plausible 
must not the Germans have thought 
plausible? Must it not have confirmed 
their belief in the ** inevitability " of a 
war — that belief which, by itself, has been 
enough to produce war after war, and, in 
particular^ the war of 1870? Must there 
not have been strengthened in their minds 
that particular current among the many that 
were making for war? And must not 
similar suspicions have been active, with 
similar results, on the side of France and 
Russia? The armaments engender fear, the 
fear in turn engenders armatments, and in 
that vicious circle turns the policy of Europe, 
till this or that Power precipitates the con- 
flict, miich as a man hanging in terror over 
the edge of a' cliff ends by losing his nerve 
and throwing himself over. That is the real 
lesson of the rivalry in armaments. That 
is certain. The rest remains conjecture. 

12. Europe since the Decade 1890- 1900. 

Let us now, endeavouring to bear in our 
minds the whole situation we have been 



EUROPE SINCE 1890- 1900 95 

analysing, consider a little more particularly 
the various episodes and crises of inter- 
national policy from the year 1890 onwards. 
I take that date, the date of Bismarck's 
resignation, for the reason already given 
(p. 42). It was not until then that it would 
have occurred to any competent observer 
to accuse Germany of an aggressive policy 
calculated to disturb the peace of Europe. 
A closer rapprochement with England was, 
indeed, the first idea of the Kaiser when he 
took over the reins of power in 1888. And 
during the ten years that followed British 
sympathies were actually drawn towards 
Germany and alienated from France. » It is 

^ The columns of The Times for 1899 are full of 
attacks upon France. Once more we may cite from 
the dispatch of the Comte de Lalaing, Belgian Minister 
in London, dated May 24, 1907, commenting on current 
or recalUng earUer events : *' A certain section of the 
Press, known here under the name of the Yellow Press, 
is in great part responsible for the hostility that exists 
between the two nations (England and Germany). 
What, in fact, can one expect from a journalist like 
Mr. Harmsworth, now Lord Northcliffe, proprietor 
of the Daily Mail, Daily Mirror, Daily Graphic, Daily 
Express, Evening News, and Weekly Dispatch, who in 
an interview given to the Matin says, * Yes, we detest 
the Germans cordially. They make themselves odious 



96 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 

well known that Mr. Chamberlain favoured 
an alliance with Germany, ^ and that when 
the Anglo -Japanese treaty was being nego- 
tiated the inclusion of Germany was seriously 
considered by Lord Lansdowne. The tele- 
gram of the Kaiser to Kruger in 1895 no 

to all Europe. I will never allow the least thing to 
be printed in my journal which might wound France, 
but I would not let anything be printed which might 
be agreeable to Germany.' Yet, in 1899, this same 
man was attacking the French with the same violence, 
wanted to boycott the Paris Exhibition, and wrote : 
* The French have succeeded in persuading John Bull 
that they are his deadly enemies. England long hesi- 
tated between France and Germany, but she has 
always respected the German character, while she 
has come to despise France. A cordial understand- 
ing cannot exist between England and her nearest 
neighbour. We have had enough of France, who 
has neither courage nor political sense.' " Lalaing does 
not give his references, and I cannot therefore verify 
his quotations. But they hardly require it. The volte- 
face of The Times is sufficiently well known. And only 
too well known is the way in which the British nation 
allows its sentiments for other nations to be dictated to 
it by a handful of cantankerous journalists. 

' *' I may point out to you that, at bottom, the char- 
acter, the main character, of the Teuton race differs 
very slightly indeed from the character of the Anglo- 
Saxon {cheers)f and the same sentiments which bring 
us into a close sympathy with the United States of 



EUROPE SINCE 1890-1900 97 

doubt left an unpleasant impression in 
England, and German feeling, of course, at 
the time of the Boer War, ran strongly 
against England, but so did feeling in 
France and America, and, indeed, through- 
out the civilized world. It was certainly 
the determination of Germany to build a 
great navy that led to the tension between 
her and England, and finally to the forma- 
tion of the Triple Entente, as a counter- 
poise to the Triple Alliance. It is 1900, 
not 1888, still less 1870, that marks the 
period at which German policy began to 
be a disturbing element in Europe. During 
the years that followed, the principal storm- 
centres in international policy were the Far 
and Near East, the Balkans, and Morocco. 
Events in the Far East, important though 

America may be invoked to bring us into closer 
sympathy with the Empire of Germany." He goes 
on to advocate '* a new Triple Alliance between the. 
Teutonic race and the two great branches of the Anglo- 
Saxon race" (see The Times, December i, 1899). This 
was at the beginning of the Boer war. Two years later, 
in October, 1901, Mr. Chamberlain was attacking Ger- 
many at Edinburgh. This date is clearly about the 
turning-point in British sentiment and policy towards 
Germany. 

7 



98 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 

they were, need not detain us here, for their 
contribution to the present war was remote 
and indirect, except so far as concerns the 
participation of Japan. Of the situation 
in the other areas, the tension and its 
causes and effects, we must try to form 
some clear general idea. This can be done 
even in the absence of that detailed infor- 
mation of what was going on behind the 
scenes for which a historian will have to 
wait . 

13. Germany: and Turkey. 

Let us begin with the Near East. The 
situation there, when Germany began her 
enterprise, is thus summed up by a French 
writer i : — 

Astride across Europe and Asia, the Ottoman Empire 
represented, for all the nations of the old continent, 
the cosmopolitan centre where each had erected, by 
dint of patience and ingenuity, a fortress of interests, 
influences, and special rights. Each fortress watched 
jealously to maintain its particular advantages in face 
of the rival enemy. If one of them obtained a con- 
cession, or a new favour, immediately the commanders 



^ Pierre Albin, ^' D'Agadir a Serajevo," p. 81. 



GERMANY AND TURKEY 99 

of the others were seen issuing from their walls to 
claim from the Grand Tm-k concessions or favours 
which should maintain the existing balance of power or 
prestige. . . . France acted as protector of the Chris- 
tians ; England, the vigilant guardian of the routes to 
India, maintained a privileged political and economic 
position ; Austria- Hungary mounted guard over the 
route to Salonica ; Russia, protecting the Armenians 
and Slavs of the South of Europe, watched over the fate 
of the Orthodox. There was a general understanding 
among them all, tacit or express, that none should 
better its situation at the expense of the others. 

When into this precariously balanced sys- 
tem of conflicting interests Germany began 
to throw her weight, the necessary result was 
a disturbance of equiUbrium. As early as 
1839 German ambition had been directed 
towards this region by Von Moltke ; but 
it was not till 1873 that the process of 
" penetration " began. In that year the 
enterprise of the Anatolian railway was 
launched by German financiers. In the 
succeeding years it extended itself as far 
as Konia ; and in 1899 and 1902 conces- 
sions were obtained for an extension to 
Bagdad and the Persian Gulf. It was at 
this point that the question became one of 
international politics. Nothing could better 
illustrate the lamentable character of the 



lOO THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 

European anarchy than the treatment of 
this matter by the interests and the Powers 
affected. Here had been launched on a 
grandiose scale a great enterprise of civiliza- 
tion. The Mesopotamian plain^ the cradle of 
civilization, and for centuries the granary of 
the world, was to be redeemed by irrigation 
from the encroachment of the desert, order 
and security were to be restored, labour to 
be set at work, and science and power to 
be devoted on a great scale to their only 
proper purpose, the increase of life. Here 
was an idea fit to inspire the most generous 
imagination. Here, for all the idealism of 
youth and the ambition of maturity, for 
diplomatists, engineers, administrators, agri- 
culturists, educationists, an opportunity for 
the work of a lifetime, a task to appeal 
at once to the imagination, the intellect, and 
the organizing capacity of practical men, a 
scheme in which all nations might be 
proud to participate, and by which Europe 
might show to the backward populations 
that the power she had won over Nature 
was to be used for the benefit of man, and 
that the science and the arms of the West 
were destined to recreate the hfe of the 
East. What happened, in fact? No sooner 



GERMANY AND TURKEY loi 

did the Germans approach the other nations 
for financial and poHtical support to their 
scheme than there was an outcry of jealousy, 
suspicion, and rage. All the vested interests 
of the other States were up in arms. 
The proposed railway, it was said, would 
compete with the Trans-Siberian, with the 
French railways, with the ocean route to 
India, with the steamboats on the Tigris. 
Corn in Mesopotamia would bring down 
the price of corn in Russia. German trade 
would oust British and French and Russian 
trade. Nor was that all. Under cover of 
an economic enterprise, Germany was nurs- 
ing political ambitions. She w^as aiming at 
Egypt and the Suez Canal, at the control 
of the Persian Gulf, at the domination of 
Persia, at the route to India. Were these 
fears and suspicions justified? In the 
European anarchy, who can say? Certainly 
the entry of a new economic competitor, the 
exploitation of new areas, the opening out 
of new trade routes, must interfere with 
interests already established. That must 
always be so in a changing world. But 
no one would seriously maintain that that 
is a reason for abandoning new enterprises. 
But, it was urged, in fact Germany will 



I02 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 

take the opportunity to squeeze out the 
trade of other nations and to constitute a 
German monopoly. Germany, it is true, 
was ready to give guarantees of the " open 
door." But then, what was the value of 
these guarantees ? She asserted that her 
enterprise was economic, and had no ulterior 
political gains. But who would believe her? 
Were not German Jingoes already rejoicing 
at the near approach of German armies to 
the Egyptian frontiers? In the European 
anarchy all these fears, suspicions, and 
rivalries were inevitable. But the British 
Government at least was not carried away 
by them. They were willing that British 
capital should co-operate on condition that 
the enterprise should be under international 
control. They negotiated for terms which 
would give equal control to Germany, Eng- 
land, and France. They failed to get these 
terms, why has not been made public. 
But Lord Cranborne, then Under-Secretary 
of State, said in the House of Commons that 
** the outcry which was made in this matter 
—I think it a very ill-informed outcry — 
made it exceedingly difficult for us to get 
the terms we required." i And Sir Clinton 
^ Hansard, 1903, vol. 126, p. 120. 



GERMANY AND TURKEY 103 

Dawkins wrote in a letter to Herr Gwinner, 
the chief of the Deutsche Bank : " The 
fact is that the business has become involved 
in politics here, and has been sacrificed to 
the very violent and bitter feeling against 
Germany exhibited by the majority of news- 
papers and shared in by a large number 
of people." I British co-operation, there- 
fore, failed, as French and Russian had 
failed. The Germans, however, persevered 
with their enterprise, now a purely German 
one, and ultimately with success. Their dif- 
ferences with Russia were arranged by an 
agreement about the Turko -Persian rail- 
ways signed in 1 9 1 1 . An agreement with 
France, with regard to the Railways of Asiatic 
Turkey, was signed in February 19 14, and 
one with England (securing our interests on 
the Persian Gulf) in June of the same year. 
Thus just before the war broke out this 
thorny question had, in fact, been settled 
to the satisfaction of all the Powers con- 
cerned. And on this two comments may 
be made. First, that the long friction, the 
press campaign, the rivalry of economic 
and political interests, had contributed 
largely to the European tension. Secondly, 
^ Nineteenth Century, June 1909, vol. 65, p. 1090. 



I04 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 

that in spite of that, the question did get 
settled, and by diplomatic means. On this 
subject, at any rate, war was not " inevit- 
able." Further, it seems clear that the 
British Government, so far from " hemming - 
in " Germany in this matter, were ready 
from the first to accept, if not to welcome, 
her enterprise, subject to their quite 
legitimate and necessary preoccupation 
with their position on the Persian Gulf. 
It was the British Press and what lay 
behind it that prevented the co-opera- 
tion of British capital. Meantime the 
economic penetration of Asia Minor by 
Germany had been accompanied by a 
political penetration at Constantinople. 
Already, as early as 1898, the Kaiser had 
announced at Damascus that the " three 
hundred millions of Mussulmans who live 
scattered over the globe may be assured 
that the German Emperor will be at all 
times their friend." 

This speech, made immediately after the 
Armenian massacres, has been very properly 
reprobated by all who are revolted at such 
atrocities. But the indignation of English- 
men must be tempered by shame when they 
remember that it was their own minister, 



GERMANY AND TURKEY 105 

still the idol of half the nation, who rein- 
stated Turkey after the earlier massacres in 
Bulgaria and put back the inhabitants of 
Macedonia for another generation under the 
murderous oppression of the Turks. The 
importance of the speech in the history of 
Europe is that it signalled the advent of 
German influence in the Near East. That 
influence was strengthened on the Bosphorus 
after the Turkish revolution of 1908, in 
spite of the original Anglophil bias of the 
Young Turks, and as some critics maintain, 
in consequence of the blundering of the 
British representatives. The mission of Von 
der Goltz in 1908 and that of Liman von 
Sanders in 1 9 1 4 put the Turkish army under 
German command, and by the outbreak of 
the war German influence was predominant 
in Constantinople. This political influence 
was, no doubt, used, and intended to be 
used, to further German economic schemes. 
Germany, in fact, had come in to play the 
same game as the other Powers, and had 
played it with more skill and determination. 
She was, of course, here as elsewhere, a new 
and disturbing force in a system of forces 
which already had difiiculty in maintaining 
a precarious equilibrium. But to be a new 



io6 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 

and disturbing force is not to commit a crime . 
Once more the real culprit was not Germany 
nor any other Power. The real culprit was 
the European anarchy. 



14. Austria and the Balkans. 

I turn now to the Balkan question. This 
is too ancient and too complicated to be even 
summarized here. But we must remind our- 
selves of the main situation. Primarily, the 
Balkan question is, or rather was, one 
between subject Christian populations and 
the Turks. But it has been complicated, not 
only by the quarrels of the subject popula- 
tions among themselves, but by the rival 
ambitions and claims of Russia and Austria. 
The interest of Russia in the Balkans is 
partly one of racial sympathy, partly one 
of territorial ambition, for the road to Con- 
stantinople lies through Rumania and Bul- 
garia. It is this territorial ambition of 
Russia that has given occasion in the past 
to the intervention of the Western Powers, 
for until recently it was a fixed principle, 
both of French and British policy, to keep 
Russia out of the Mediterranean. Hence 



AUSTRIA AND THE BALKANS 107 

the Crimean War, and hence the disastrous 
intervention of Disraeh after the treaty of 
San Stefano in 1878 — an intervention which 
perpetuated for years the Balkan hell. 
The interest of Austria in the peninsula 
depends primarily on the fact that the 
Austrian Empire contains a large Slav 
population desiring its independence, and 
that this national ambition of the Austrian 
Slavs finds in the independent kingdom of 
Serbia its natural centre of attraction. The 
determination of Austria to retain her Slavs 
as unwilling citizens of her Empire brings 
her also into conflict with Russia, so far 
as Russia is the protector of the Slavs. The 
situation, and the danger with which it is 
pregnant, may be realized by an English- 
man if he will suppose St. George's Channel 
and the Atlantic to be annihilated, and 
Ireland to touch, by a land frontier, on the 
one side Great Britain, on the other the 
United States. The friction and even the 
warfare which might have arisen between 
these two great Powers from the plots of 
American Fenians may readily be imagined. 
Something of that kind is the situation of 
Austria in relation to Serbia and her pro- 
tector, Russia. Further, Austria fears the 



io8 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 

occupation by, any Slav State of any port 
on the coast line of the Adriatic, and herself 
desires a port on the ^gean. Add to this 
the recent German dream of the route 
from Berlin to Bagdad, and the European 
importance of what would otherwise be local 
disputes among the Balkan States becomes 
apparent . 

During the period we are now considering 
the Balkan factor first came into promi- 
nence with the annexation by Austria of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908. Those 
provinces, it will be remembered, were 
handed over to Austrian protection at the 
Congress of Berlin in 1878. Austria went 
in and policed the country, much as England 
went in and policed Egypt, and, from the 
material point of view, with similarly suc- 
cessful results. But, like England in Egypt, 
Austria was not sovereign there. Formal 
sovereignty still rested with the Turk. In 
1909, during the Turkish revolution, Austria 
took the ppportunity to throw off that 
nominal suzerainty. Russia iprotested, 
Austria mobilized against Serbia and 
Montenegro, and war seemed imminent. 
But the dramatic intervention of Germaay 
** in shining armour " on the side of her 



AUSTRIA AND THE BALKANS 109 

ally resulted in a diplomatic victory for the 
Central Powers. Austria gained her point, 
and war, for the moment, was avoided. But 
such diplomatic victories are dangerous. 
Russia did not forget, and the events of 1909 
were an operative cause in the catastrophe 
of 1 9 14. In acting as she did in this matter 
Austria-Hungary defied the public law of 
Europe, and Germany supported her in 
doing so. 

The motives of Germany in taking this 
action are thus described, and probably with 
truth, by Baron Bey ens : " She could not 
allow the solidity of the Triple Alliance to 
be shaken : she had a debt of gratitude t,o 
pay to her ally, who had supported her at 
the Congress of Algeciras. Finally, she 
believed herself to be the object of an 
attempt at encirclement by Erance^ England, 
and Russia, and was anxious to show that 
the gesture of putting her hand to the sword 
was enough to dispel the illusions of her, 
adversaries." ^ These are the kind of 
reasons that all Powers consider adequate 
where what they conceive to be their inter- 
ests are involved. From any higher, more 
international point of view, they are no 
^ " L'AUemagne avant la guerre," p. 240. 



no THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 

reasons at all. But in such a matter no 
Power is in a position to throw the first 
stone. The whole episode is a classical 
example for the normal working of the 
European anarchy. Austria-Hungary was 
primarily to blame, but Germany, who 
supported her^ must take her share. The 
other Powers of Europe acquiesced for the 
sake of peace, and they could probably do 
no better. There will never be any guarantee 
for the public law of Europe until there is 
a public tribunal and a public force to see 
that its decisions are carried out. 

The next events of importance in this 
region were the two Balkan wars. We need 
not here go into the causes and results of 
these, except so far as to note that, once 
more, the rivalry of Russia and Austria 
played a disastrous part. It was the deter- 
mination of Austria not to give Serbia access 
to the Adriatic that led Serbia to retain 
territories assigned by treaty to Bulgaria, 
and so precipitated the second Balkan war ; 
for that war was due to the indignation 
caused in Bulgaria by the breach of faith, 
and is said to have been directly prompted 
by Austria. The bad p^rt played by Austria 



AUSTRIA AND THE BALKANS iii 



throughout this crisis is indisputable. But 
it must be observed that, by general admis- 
sion, Germany throughout worked hand in 
hand with Sir Edward Grey to keep the 
peace of Europe, which, indeed, otherwise 
could not have been kept. And nothing 
illustrates this better than that episode of 
1 91 3 which is sometimes taken to throw 
discredit upon Germany. The episode was 
thus described by the Italian minister, 
Giolitti : "On the 9th of August, 191 3, 
about a year before the war broke out, I, 
being then absent from Rome, received from 
my colleague, San Giuliano, the following 
telegram : ' Austria has communicated to us 
and to Germany her intention to act against 
Serbia, and defines such action as defensive, 
hoping to apply the casus foederis of the 
Triple Alliance, which I consider inapplic- 
able. I intend to join forces with Germany 
to prevent any such action by Austria, but 
it will be necessary to say clearly that we 
do not consider such eventual action as 
defensive, and therefore do not believe that 
the casus foederis exists. Please telegraph 
to Rome if you approve.' 

'* I replied that, * if Austria intervenes 
against Serbia, it is evident that the casus 



112 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 

foederis does not arise. It is an action that 
she undertakes on her own account, since 
there is no question of defence, as no one 
thinks of attacking her. It is necessary 
to make a declaration in this sense to 
Austria in the most formal way, and it is to 
be wished that German action may dissuade 
Austria from her most perilous adventure.' " ' 

Now this statement shows upon the face 
of it two things. One, that Austria was 
prepared, by attacking Serbia, to unchain 
a European war ; the other, that the Italian 
ministers joined with Germany to dissuade 
her. They v/ere successful. Austria aban- 
doned her project, and war was avoided. 
The episode is as discreditable as you like 
to Austria. But, on the face of it, how 
does it discredit Germany ? More, of course, 
may lie behind ; but no evidence has been 
produced, so far as I am aware, to show 
that the Austrian project was approved or 
supported by her ally. 

The Treaty of Bucharest, which concluded 
the second Balkan War, left all the parties 

^ It is characteristic of the way history is written 
in time of war that M. Yves Guyot, citing GioHtti's 
statement, omits the references to Germany. See '' Les 
causes et les consequences de la guerre/' p. loi. 



AUSTRIA AND THE BALKANS 113 

concerned dissatisfied. But, in particular, 
it left the situation between Austria and 
Serbia and between Austria and Russia 
more strained than ever. It was this 
situation that was the proximate cause of 
the present war. Eor, as we have seen, 
a quarrel between Austria and Russia over 
the Balkans must^ given the system of 
alliances, unchain a European war. For 
producing that situation Austria-Hungary 
was mainly responsible. The part played 
by Germany was secondary, and throughout 
the Balkan wars German diplomacy was 
certainly working, with England, for peace. 
" The diplomacy of the Wilhelmstrasse," 
says Baron Beyens, " applied itself, above 
all, to calm the exasperation and the desire 
for intervention at the Ballplatz." " The 
Cabinet of Berlin did not follow that of 
Vienna in its tortuous policy of intrigues at 
Sofia and Bucharest. As M. Zimmermann 
said to me at the time, the Imperial Govern- 
ment contented itself with maintaining its 
neutrality in relation to the Balkans, abstain- 
ing from any intervention, beyond advice, in 
the fury, of their quarrels. There is no reason 
to doubt the sincerity of this statement." i 

^ " L'Allemagne avant la guerre," pp. 248, 262. 

8 



114 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 



15. Morocco. 

Let us turn now to the other storm-centre, 
Morocco. The salient features here were, 
first, the treaty of 1880, to which all the 
Great Powers, including, of course, Ger- 
many, were parties, and which guaranteed 
to the signatories most -favoured-nation 
treatment ; secondly, the interest of Great 
Britain to prevent a strong Power from 
establishing itself opposite Gibraltar and 
threatening British control over the Straits ; 
thirdly, the interest of France to annex 
Morocco and knit it up with the North 
African Empire ; fourthly, the newi colonial 
and trading interests of Germany, which, 
as she had formally announced, could not 
leave her indifferent to any new dispositions 
of influence or territory in undeveloped 
countries. Eor many years French ambi- 
tions in Morocco had been held in check 
by the British desire to maintain the status 
quo. But the Anglo-Erench Entente of 
1904 gave France a free hand there in 
return for the abandontn'ent of French oppo- 
sition to the British position in Egypt. The 
Anglo-French treaty of 1904 affirtnfed, in 



MOROCCO 115 

the clauses made public, the independence 
and integrity of Morocco ; but there were 
secret clauses looking to its partition. By 
these the British interest in the Straits was 
guaranteed by an arrangement which gave 
to Spain the reversion of the coast opposite 
Gibraltar and a strip on the north-west 
coast, while leaving the rest of the country 
to fall to Erance. Germany was not con- 
sulted while these arrangements were being 
made, and the secret clauses of the treaty 
were, of course, not communicated to her. 
But it seems reasonable to suppose that they 
became known to, or at least were suspected 
by, the German Government shortly after 
they were adopted.^ And probably it was 
this that led to the dramatic intervention 

See '' Morocco in Diplomacy,'' Chap. XVI. A 
dispatch written by M. Leghait, the Belgian minister 
in Paris, on May 7, 1905, shows that rumour was 
busy on the subject. The secret clauses of the 
Franco-Spanish treaty were known to him, and these 
provided for an eventual partition of Morocco between 
France and Spain. He doubted whether there were 
secret clauses in the Anglo-French treaty — ** but it is 
supposed that there is a certain tacit understanding by 
which England would leave France sufficient liberty of 
action in Morocco under the reserve of the secret 
clauses of the Franco-Spanish arrangement, clauses if 



ii6 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 

of the Kaiser at Tangier/ when he announced 
that the independence of Morocco was under 
German protection. The result was the 
Conference of Algeciras^ at which the inde- 
pendence and integrity of Morocco was once 
more affirmed (the clauses looking to its 
partition being still kept secret by the three 
Powers privy to them), and equal commer- 
cial facilities were guaranteed to all the 
Powers. Germany thereby obtained what 
she most wanted^ what she had a right to 
by the treaty of 1880, and what otherwise 
might have been threatened by French occu- 
pation—the maintenance of the open door. 
But the French enterprise was not aban- 
doned. Disputes with the natives such as 
always occur^ or are manufactured, in these 
cases^ led to fresh military intervention. At 

not imposed yet at least strongly supported by the 
London Cabinet." 

We know, of course, now, that the arrangement for 
the partition was actually embodied in secret clauses 
in the Anglo-French treaty. 

^ According to M. Yves Guyot, when the Kaiser was 
actually on his way to Tangier, he telegraphed from 
Lisbon to Prince Biilow abandoning the project. 
Prince Biilow telegraphed back insisting, and the 
Kaiser yielded. 



MOROCCO 117 

the same time, it was difficult to secure the 
practical application of the principle of equal 
commercial opportunity. An agreement of 
1909 between France and Germany, whereby 
both Powers were to share equally in con- 
tracts for public works, was found in prac- 
tice not to work. The Germans pressed 
for its application, to the new railways pro- 
jected in Morocco. The French delayed, 
temporized, and postponed decision. ^ Mean- 
time they were strengthening their position 
in Morocco. The matter was brought to 
a head by the expedition to Fez. Initiated 
on the plea of danger to the European resi- 
dents at the capital (a plea which was 
disputed by the Germans and by many 
Frenchmen), it clearly heralded a definite 
final occupation of the country. The 
patience of the Germans was exhausted, 
and the Kaiser made the coup of Agadir. 
There followed the Mansion House speech 
of Mr. Lloyd George and the Franco-Ger- 
man agreement of November 191 1, whereby 
Germany recognized a French protectorate 

' See Bourdon, ''L'Enigme Allemande," Chap. II. 
This account, by a Frenchman, will not be suspected 
of anti-French or pro-German bias, and it is based on 
French official records. 



ii8 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY, 

in Morocco in return for concessions of 
territory in the French Congo. These are 
the bare facts of the Moroccan episode. 
Much, of course, is still unrevealed, par- 
ticularly as to the motives and intentions of 
the Powers concerned. Did Germany, for 
instance, intend to seize a share of Morocco 
when she sent the Panther to Agadir? And 
was that the reason of the vigour of the 
British intervention? Possibly, but by no 
means certainly ; the evidence accessible is 
conflicting. If Germany had that intention, 
she was frustrated by the solidarity shown 
between Erance and England, and the 
result was the final and definite absorption 
of Morocco in the Erench Empire, with the 
approval and active support of Great Britain, 
Germany being compensated by the cession 
of part of the Erench Congo. Once more 
a difhcult question had been settled by diplo- 
macy, but only after it had twice brought 
Europe to the verge of war, and in such a 
way as to leave behind the bitterest feelings 
of anger and mistrust in all the parties 
concerned. 

The facts thus briefly summarized here 
may be studied more at length, with the 
relevant documents, in Mr. Morel's book 



MOROCCO 119 

" Morocco in Diplomacy." The reader will 
form his own opinion on the part played by 
the various Powers. But I do not believe 
that any instructed and impartial student 
will accept what appears to be the current 
English view, that the action of Germany 
in this episode was a piece of sheer 
aggression without excuse, and that the 
other Powers were acting throughout justly, 
honestly, and straightforwardly. 

The Morocco crisis, as we have already 
seen, produced in Germany a painful im- 
pression, and strengthened there the ele- 
ments making for war. Thus Baron Beyens 
writes :— 

The Moroccan conflicts made many Germans hitherto 
pacific regard another war as a necessary evil.* 

And again : — 

The pacific settlement of the conflict of 191 1 gave 
a violent impulse to the war party in Germany, to the 
propaganda of the League of Defence and the Navy 
League, and a greater force to their demands. To 
their dreams of hegemony and domination the desire 
for revenge against France now mingled its bitterness. 
A diplomatic success secured in an underground 



" L'Allemagne avant la guerre," p. 216. 



I20 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 

struggle signified nothing. War, war in the open, that 
alone, in the eyes of this rancorous tribe, could settle 
definitely the Moroccan question by incorporating 
Morocco and all French Africa in the colonial empire 
they hoped to create on the shores of the Mediter- 
ranean and in the heart of the Black Continent.^ 



This we may take to be a correct descrip- 
tion of the attitude of the Pangermans. 
But there is no evidence that it was that 
of the nation . We have seen also that Baron 
Bey ens' impression of the attitude of the 
German people, even after the Moroccan 
affair, was of a general desire for peace .^ 
The crisis had been severe, but it had been 
tided over, and the Governments seem to 
have made renewed efforts to come into 
friendly relations. In this connection the 
following dispatch of Baron Bey ens (June 
191 2) is worth quoting: — 

After the death of Edward VII, the Kaiser, as well 
as the Crown Prince, when they returned from Eng- 
land, where they had been courteously received, were 
persuaded that the coldness in the relations of the 
preceding years was going to yield to a cordial 



^ " L'AUemagne avant la guerre," p. 235. 
" See above, p. 63. 



MOROCCO 121 

intimacy between the two Courts and that the causes of 
the misunderstanding between the two peoples would 
vanish with the past. His disillusionment, therefore, 
was cruel when he saw the Cabinet of London range 
itself last year on the side of France. But the Kaiser 
is obstinate, and has not abandoned the hope of 
reconquering the confidence of the English.^ 

This dispatch is so far borne out by the 
facts that in the year succeeding the 
Moroccan crisis a serious attempt was made 
to improve Anglo -German relations, and 
there is no reason to doubt that on both 
sides there was a genuine desire for an 
understanding. How that understanding 
failed has already been indicated .2 But 
even that failure did not ruin the relations 
between the two Powers. In the Balkan 
crisis, as we have seen and as is admitted 
on both sides, England and Germany worked 
together for peace. And the fact that a 
European conflagration was then avoided, 
in spite of the tension between Russia and 
Austria, is a strong proof that the efforts 
of Sir Edward Grey w^ere sincerely and 
effectively seconded by Germany .3 

^ This view is reaffirmed by Baron Beyens in 
" L'AUemagne avant la guerre," p. 29. 

= See above, p. 79. 3 Above, p. iii. 



122 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 



1 6. The Last Years, 

We have reached, then, the lyear 1 9 1 3, and 
the end of the Balkan wars, without dis- 
covering in German pohcy any clear signs of 
a determination to^ produce a European war. 
We have found all the Powers, Germany 
included, contending for territory and trade 
at the risk of the peace of Europe ; we 
have found Germany successfully develop- 
ing her interests in Turkey ; we have found 
England annexing the South African re- 
publics, France Morocco, Italy Tripoli ; we 
have found all the Powers stealing in China, 
and in all these transactions we have found 
them continually on the point of being at 
one another's throats. Nevertheless, some 
last instinct of self-preservation has enabled 
them, so far, to pull up in time . The crises 
had been overcome without a war. Yet 
they had, of course, produced their effects. 
Some statesmen probably, like Sir Edward 
Grey, had had their passion for peace con- 
firmed by the dangers encountered. In 
others, 'no doubt, an opposite effect had been 
produced, and very likely by 19 13 there 
were prominent men in Europe convinced 



THE LAST YEARS 123 

that war must come, and manoeuvring only 
that it should come at the time and occasion 
most favourable to their country. That, 
according to M. Cambon, was now the 
attitude of the German Emperor. M. Cam- 
bon bases this view on an alleged conversa- 
tion between the Kaiser and the King of 
the Belgians.^ The conversation has been 
denied by the German official organ, but 
that, of course, is no proof that it did not 
take place, and there is nothing improbable 
in what M. Cambon narrates. 

The conversation is supposed to have 
occurred in November 1 9 1 3, at a time when, 
as we have seen,2 there was a distinct out- 
burst in France of anti -German chauvinism, 
and when the arming and counter-arming 
of that year had exasperated opinion to an 
extreme degree. The Kaiser is reported 
to have said that war between Germany and 
France was inevitable. If he did, it is clear 

^ French Yellow Book, No. 6. In " L'AUemagne 
avant la guerre " (p. 24) Baron Beyens states that this 
conversation was held at Potsdam on November 5th 
or 6th ; the Kaiser said that war between Germany and 
France was " inevitable and near." Baron Beyens, 
presumably, is the authority from whom M. Cambon 
derives his information. ^ Above, p. 25. 



124 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 

from the context that he said it in the belief 
that French chauvinism would produce war. 
For the King of the Belgians, in replying, 
is stated to have said that it was " a travesty 
of the French Government to interpret it 
in that sense, and to let oneself be misled 
as to the sentiments of the French nation 
by the ebullitions of a few irresponsible 
spirits or the intrigues of unscrupulous 
agitators." It should be observed also that 
this supposed attitude on the part of the 
Kaiser is noted as a change, and that he 
is credited with having previously stood 
for peace against the designs of the German 
Jingo es. His personal influence, says the 
dispatch, *' had been exerted on many critical 
occasions in support of peace." The fact 
of a change of mind in the Kaiser is accepted 
also by Baron Beyens. 

Whatever may be the truth in this matter, 
neither the German nor the French nor our 
own Government can then have abandoned 
the effort at peaceable settlement. For, in 
fact, by the summer of 1 9 1 4, agreements had 
been made between the Great Powers which 
settled for the time being the questions im- 
mediately outstanding. It is understood that 
a new partition of African territory had been 



THE LAST YEARS 125 

arranged to meet the claims and interests of 
Germany, France, and England alike. The 
question of the Bagdad railway had been 
settled, and everything seemed to favour 
the maintenance of peace, when, suddenly, 
the murder of the Archduke sprang upon 
a dismayed Europe the crisis that was at 
last to prove fatal. The events that fol- 
lowed, so far as they can be ascertained 
from published documents, have been so 
fully discussed that it would be super- 
fluous for me to go over the ground 
again in all its detail. But I will indicate 
briefly what appear to me to be the main 
points of importance in fixing the respon- 
sibility for what occurred. 

First, the German view, that England is 
responsible for the war because she did not 
prevent Russia from entering upon it, I 
regard as childish, if it is not simply 
sophistical. The German Powers deliber- 
ately take an action which the whole past 
history of Europe shows must almost cer- 
tainly lead to a European war, and they then 
turn round upon Sir Edward Grey and put 
the blame on him because he did not succeed 
in preventing the consequences of their own 
action. "He might have kept Russia out." 



126 THE EUROPEAN AN ARCH Y 

Who knows whether he might? What we 
do know is that it was Austria and Germany 
who brought her in. The German view is 
really only intelligible upon the assumption 
that Germany has a right to do what she 
pleases and that the Powers that stand in 
her way are by definition peacebreakers . It 
is this extraordinary attitude that has been 
one of the factors for making war in 
Europe . 

Secondly, I am not, and have not been, 
one of the critics of Sir Edward Grey. T^t 
iSj indeed, possible, as it is always possible 
after the event, to suggest that some other 
course might have been more successful in 
avoiding war. But that is conjecture. I^ 
at any rate, am convinced, as I believe 
every one outside Germany is convinced, 
that Sir Ed^vard Grey throughout the nego- 
tiations had one object only— to avoid, if 
he could, the catastrophe of war. 

Thirdly, the part of Austria- Hungary is 
perfectly clear. She was determined now, as 
in 1 9 1 3, to have out her quarrel with Serbia, 
at the risk of a European wa,r. Her guilt 
is clear and definite, and it is only the fact 
that we are not directly fighting her with 
British troops that has prevented British 



THE LAST YEARS 127 

opinion from fastening upon it as the main 
occasion of the war. 

But this time, quite clearly, Austria was 
backed by Germany. Why this change in 
German policy? So far as the Kaiser him- 
self is concerned, there can be little doubt 
that a main cause was the horror he felt at 
the assassination of the Archduke. The absurd 
system of autocracy gives to the emotional 
reactions of an individual a preposterous 
weight in determining world-policy ; and 
the almost insane feeling of the Kaiser about 
the sanctity of crowned heads was no doubt 
a main reason why Germany backed Austria 
in sending her ultimatum to Serbia. Accord- 
ing to Baron Beyens, on hearing the news 
of the murder of the Archduke the Kaiser 
changed colour, and exclaimed : " All the 
effort of my life for twenty-five years must 
be begun over again ! " ^ A tragic cry which 
indicates, what I personally believe to be the 
case, that it has been the constant effort of 
the Kaiser to keep the peace in Europe^ 
and that he foresaw now that he would no 
longer be able to resist war. 

So far, however, it would only be the 
war between Austria and Serbia that the 
' " L'AUemagne avant la guerre," p. 273. 



128 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 

Kaiser would be prepared to sanction. He 
might hope to avoid the European war. 
And, in fact, there is good reason to suppose 
that both he and the German Foreign Office 
did cherish that hope or delusion. They 
had bluffed Russia off in 1908. They had 
the dang^erous idea that they might bluff her 
off again. In this connection Baron Beyens 
records a conversation with his colleague, 
M. Bollati, the Italian Ambassador at Berlin, 
in which the latter took the view that 

at Vienna as at Berlin they were persuaded that 
Russia, in spite of the official assurances exchanged 
quite recently between the Tsar and M. Poincare, 
as to the complete preparations of the armies of 
the two allies, was not in a position to sustain a 
European war and would not dare to plunge into so 
perilous an adventure. 

Baron Beyens continues : — 

At Berlin the opinion that Russia was unable to 
face a European war prevailed not only in the official 
world and in society, but among all the manufacturers 
who specialized in the construction of armaments. 
M. Krupp, the best qualified among them to express an 
opinion, announced on the 28th July, at a table next 
mine at the Hotel Bristol, that the Russian artillery was 
neither good nor complete, while that of the German 
army had never been of such superior quality. It would 



THE LAST YEARS 129 

be folly on the part of Russia, the great maker of guns 
concluded, to dare to make war on Germany and 
Austria in these conditions.^ 



But while the attitude of the German 
Foreign Ofifice and (as I am inclined to 
suppose) of the Kaiser may have been that 
which I have just suggested, there were 
other and more important factors to be 
considered. It appears almost certain that 
at some point in the crisis the control of 
the situation was taken out of the hands 
of the civilians by the military. The posi- 
tion of the military is not difficult to under- 
stand. They believed^ as professional 
soldiers usually do^ in the " inevitability " 
of war, and they had, of course, a profes- 
sional interest in making war. Their atti- 
tude may be illustrated from a statement 
attributed by M. Bourdon to Prince Lich- 
nowsky in 19122: "The soldiers think 
about war. It is their business and their 
duty. They tell us that the German army 
is in good order, that the Russian army has 
not completed its org;anization, that it would 
be a good moment . . . but for twenty 

^ " L'Allemagne avant la guerre," p. 280 seq. 
2 See '' L'Enigme Allemande," p. 96. 

9 



I30 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 

years they have been saying the same 
thing." The passage is significant. It 
shows us exactly what it is we have to dread 
in " mihtarism." The danger in a miUtary 
State is always that when a crisis comes the 
soldiers will get control^ as they seem to have 
done on this occasion. Erom' their point 
of view there was good reason. They knew 
that Erance and Russia^ on a common under- 
standing, were making enormous military 
preparations ; they knew that these prepa- 
rations would mature by the beginning of 
1 9 1 7 ; they knew that Germany would fight 
then at a less advantage ; they believed she 
would then have to fight, and they said, 
'* Better fight now." The following dis* 
piatch of Baron Bey ens, dated July 26th, 
may probably be taken as fairly, represent- 
ing their attitude :— 

To justify these conclusions I must remind you of 
the opinion which prevails in the German General 
Staff, that war with France and Russia is unavoidable 
and near, an opinion which the Emperor has been 
induced to share. Such a war, ardently desired by the 
military and Pangerman party, might be undertaken 
to-day, as this party think, in circumstances which are 
extremely favourable to Germany, and which probably 
will not again present themselves for some time. 
Germany has finished the strengthening of her army 



THE LAST YEARS 131 

which was decreed by the law of 1912, and, on the 
other hand, she feels that she cannot carry on in- 
definitely a race in armaments with Russia and France 
which would end by her ruin. The Wehrbeitrag has 
been a disappointment for the Imperial Government, to 
whom it has demonstrated the limits of the national 
wealth. Russia has made the mistake of making a 
display of her strength before having finished her 
military reorganization. That strength will not be 
formidable for several years : at the present moment 
it lacks the railway lines necessary for its deployment. 
As to France, M. Charles Humbert has revealed her 
deficiency in guns of large calibre, but apparently it is 
this arm that will decide the fate of battles. For the 
rest, England, which during the last two years Germany 
has been trying, not without some success, to detach 
from France and Russia, is paralysed by internal dis- 
sensions and her Irish quarrels.^ 

It will be noticed that Baron Heyens sup- 
poses the Kaiser to have been in the hands 
of the soldiers as early as July 26th. On 
the other hand^ as late as August 5 th Beyens 
believed that the German Eoreign OfBce had 
been working throughout for peace. De- 
scribing an interview he had had on that 
day with Herr Zimmermann, he writes :— 

From this interview I brought away the impression 
that Herr Zimmermann spoke to me with his cus- 



» Second Belgian Grey Book, No. 8. 



132 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 

tomary sincerity, and that the Department for Foreign 
Affairs since the opening of the Austro-Serbian conflict 
had been on the side of a peaceful solution, and that it 
was not due to it that its views and counsels had not 
prevailed. ... A superior power intervened to pre- 
cipitate the march of events. It was the ultimatum 
from Germany to Russia, sent to St. Petersburg at the 
very moment when the Vienna Cabinet was showing 
itself more disposed to conciliation, which let loose 
the war.^ 



iWhy was that ultimatum sent? Accord- 
ing to the German apologists, it was sent 
because Russia had mobilized on the German 
frontier at the critical moment, and so made 
war inevitable. There is, indeed, no doubt 
that the tension was enormously increased 
throughout the critical days by mobilization 
and rumours of mobilization . The danger 
was clearly pointed out as early as July 26th 
in a dispatch of the Austrian Ambassador 
at Petrograd to his Government :— 

As the result of reports about measures taken for 
mobilization of Russian troops, Count Pourtales [German 
Ambassador at Petrograd] has called the Russian 
Minister's attention in the most serious manner to 
the fact that nowadays measures of mobilization would 



^ Second Belgian Grey Book, No. 52. 



THE LAST YEARS 133 

be a highly dangerous form of diplomatic pressure. 
For in that event the purely military consideration 
of the question by the General Staffs would find 
expression, and if that button were once touched in 
Germany the situation would get out of control.^ 

On the other hand, it must be remembered 
that in 1909 Austria had mobilized against 
Serbia and Montenegro,^ and in 191 2-1 3 
Russia and Austria had mobilized against 
one another without war ensuing; in either 
case. Moreover, in view of the slowness 
of Russian mobilization, it is difficult to 
believe that a day or two would make 
the difference between security and ruin to 
Germany. However^ it is possible that the 
Kaiser was so advised by his soldiers, and 
genuinely believed the country to be in 
danger. We do not definitely know. What 
we do know is, that it was the German 
ultimatum that precipitated the war. 

We are informed, however, by Baron 
Beyens that even at the last moment the 
German Foreign Office made one more effort 
for peace :~ 

As no reply had been received from St. Petersburg 
by noon the next day [after the dispatch of the German 

' Austrian Red Book, No. 28. "" See p. 108. 



1^4 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 

ultimatum], MM. de Jagow and Zimmermann (I have it 
from the latter) hurried to the Chancellor and the 
Kaiser to prevent the issue of the order for general 
mobilization, and to persuade his Majesty to v^rait till 
the following day. It was the last effort of their dying 
pacifism, or the last awakening of their conscience. 
Their efforts were broken against the irreducible 
obstinacy of the Minister of War and the army chiefs, 
who represented to the Kaiser the disastrous conse- 
quences of a delay of twenty-four hours.^ 



17. The Responsibility and the Moral, 

It will be seen from this brief account that 
so far as the published evidence goes I 
agree with the general view outside Germany 
that the responsibility for the war at the 
last moment rests with the Powers of Central 
Europe. The Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, 
which there can be no reasonable doubt was 
known to and approved by the German 
Government, was the first crime. And it 
is hardly palliated by the hope, which no 
well-informed men ought to have enter- 
tained, that Russia could be kept out and 
the war limited to Austria and Serbia. The 
second crime was the German ultimatum to 
Russia and to France. I have no desire 

*' L'AUemagne avant la guerre," p. 301. 



THE MORAL 135 

whatever to explain away or palliate these 
clear facts. But it was not my object in 
writing this pamphlet to reiterate a judgment 
which must already be that of all my readers . 
What I have wanted to do is to set the tragic 
events of those few days of diplomacy in 
their proper place in the whole complex of 
international politics. And what I do dis- 
pute with full conviction is the view which 
seems to be almost universally held in 
England, that Germany had been pursuing 
for years past a policy of war, while all the 
other Powers had been pursuing a policy 
of peace. The war finally provoked by 
Germany was^ I am convinced, conceived 
as a *' preventive war." And that means 
that it was due to the belief that if Germany 
did not fight then she would be compelled 
to fight at a great disadvantage later. I 
have written in vain if I have not convinced 
the reader that the European anarchy in- 
evitably provokes that state of mind in the 
Powers, and that they all live constantly 
under the threat of war. To understand 
the action of those who had power in Ger- 
many during the critical days it is necessary 
to bear in mind all that I have brought 
into relief in the preceding pages : the 



136 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 

general situation, which grouped the Powers 
of the Entente against those of the Triple 
Alliance ; the armaments and counter- arma- 
ments ; the colonial and economic rivalry ; 
the racial and national problems in South- 
East Europe ; and the long series of previous 
crises^ in each case tided over, but leav- 
ing behind, every one of them, a legacy 
of fresh mistrust and fear, which made every 
new crisis worse than the one before. I 
do not palliate the responsibility of Ger- 
many for the outbreak of war. But that 
responsibility is embedded in and con- 
ditioned by a responsibility deeper and more 
general—the responsibility of all the Powers 
alike for the European anarchy. 

If I have convinced the reader of this he 
will, I think, feel no difficulty in following 
me to a further conclusion. Since the causes 
of this war, and of all wars, lie so deep in 
the whole international system, they cannot 
be permanently removed by the " punish- 
ment " or the " crushing " or any other 
drastic treatment of any Power, let that 
Power be as guilty as you please. What- 
ever be the issue of this war, one thing is 
certain : it will bring no lasting peace to 
Europe unless it brings a radical change 



THE MORAL 137 

both in the spirit and in the organization of 
international poHtics . 

What that change must be may be 
deduced from the foregoing discussion of 
the causes of the war. The war arose from' 
the rivalry of States in the pursuit of power 
and wealth. This is universally admitted. 
■Whatever be the diversities of opinion that 
prevail in the different countries concerned, 
nobody pretends that the war arose out of 
any need of civilization, out of any generous 
impulse or noble ambition. It arose, 
according to the popular view in England, 
solely and exclusively out of the ambition 
of Germany to seize territory and power. 
It arose, according to the popular German 
view, out of the ambition of England to 
attack and destroy the rising power and 
wealth of Germany. Thus to each set of 
belligerents the war appears as one forced 
upon them by sheer wickedness, and from 
neither point of view has it any kind of 
moral justification. These views, it is true, 
are both too simple for the facts. But the 
account given in the preceding pages, im- 
perfect as it is, shows clearly, what further 
knowledge will only make more explicit, 
that the war proceeded out of rivalry for 



138 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 

empire between all the Great Powers in 
every part of the world. The contention 
between France and Germany for the control 
of Morocco, the contention between Russia 
and Austria for the control of the Balkans, 
the contention between Germany and the 
other Pov/ers for the control of Turkey— 
these were the causes of the war. And 
this contention for control is prompted at 
once by the desire for power and the desire 
for wealth. In practice the two motives 
are found conjoined. But to different minds 
they appeal in different proportions. There 
is such a thing as the love of power for its 
own sake. It is known in individuals, and 
it is known in States, and it is the most 
disastrous, if not the most evil, of the human 
passions. The modern German philosophy 
of the State turns almost exclusively upon 
this idea ; and here, as elsewhere, by giving 
to a passion an intellectual form, the Ger- 
mans have magnified its force and enhanced 
its monstrosity. But the passion itself is 
not peculiar to Germans, nor is it only they 
to whom it is and has been a motive of 
State. Power has been the fetish of kings 
and emperors from the beginning of political 
history, and it remains to be seen whether 



THE MORAL 139 

it will not continue to inspire democracies. 
The passion for empire ruined the Athenian 
democracy, no less than the Spartan or the 
Venetian oligarchy, or the Spain of Philip II, 
or the France of the Monarchy and the 
Empire. But it still makes its appeal to 
the romantic imagination. Its intoxication 
has lain behind this war, and it will prompt 
many others if it survives, when the war is 
over, either in the defeated or the conquer- 
ing nations. It is not only the jingoism 
of Germany that Europe has to fear. It is 
the jingoism that success may make supreme 
in any country that may be victorious. 

But while power may be sought for its 
own sake, it is commonly sought by modern 
States as a means to wealth. It is the pur- 
suit of markets and concessions and outlets 
for capital that lies behind the colonial 
policy that leads to wars. States compete 
for the right to exploit the weak, and in 
this competition Governments are prompted 
or controlled by financial interests. The 
British went to Egypt for the sake of 
the bondholders, the Erench to Morocco 
for the sake of its minerals and wealth. 
In the Near East and the Far it is 
commerce, concessions, loans that have 



I40 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 

led to the rivalry of the Powers, to 
war after war, to " punitive expeditions " 
and— irony of ironies !— to " indemnities " 
exacted as a new and special form of 
robbery from peoples who rose in the 
endeavour to defend themselves against 
robbery . The Powers combine for a tnoment 
to suppress the common victim, the next 
they are at one another's throats over the 
spoil. That really is the simple fact about 
the quarrels of States over colonial and 
commercial policy. So long as the ex- 
ploitation of undeveloped countries is 
directed by companies having no object 
in view except dividends, so long as finan- 
ciers prompt the policy of Governments, so 
long as military expeditions, leading up to 
annexations, are undertaken behind the back 
of the public for reasons that cannot be 
avowed, so long will the nations end with 
war, where they have begun by theft, and 
so long will thousands and millions of inno- 
cent and generous lives, the best of Europe, 
be thrown away to no purpose, because, in 
the dark, sinister interests have been risk- 
ing the peace of the world for the sake of 
money in their pockets. 

It is these tremendous underlying facts 



THE SETTLEMENT 141 

and tendencies that suggest the true moral 
of this war. It is these that have to be 
altered if we are to avoid future wars on 
a scale as great. 



18. The Settlement, 

And now^ with all this in our minds, let us 
turn to consider the vexed question of the 
settlement after the war. There lies before 
the Western world the greatest of all choices^ 
the choice between destruction and salva- 
tion. But that choice does not depend 
merely on the issue of the war. It depends 
upon what is done or left undone by the 
co-operation of all when the war does at 
last stop. Two conceptions of the future 
are contending in all nations. One is the 
old bad one, that which has presided hitherto 
at every peace and prepared every new war. 
It assumes that the object of war is solely 
to win victory, and the object of victory solely 
to acquire more power and territory. On 
this view, if the Germans win, they are to 
annex territory east and west : Belgium and 
half Erance, say the more violent ; the 
Baltic provinces of Russia, strategic points 



142 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 

of advantage, say the more moderate. On 
the other hand, if the Allies win, the Allies 
are to divide the German colonies^ the iFrench 
are to regain Alsace-Lorraine, and, as the 
jingoes add, they are to take the whole of 
the German provinces on the left bank of 
the Rhine, and even territory beyond it. The 
Italians are to have not only Italia Irredenta 
but hundreds of thousands of reluctant Slavs 
in Dalmatia ; the Russians Constantinople, 
and perhaps Posen and Galicia. Further, 
such money indemnities are to be taken as 
it may prove possible to exact from an 
already ruined foe ; trade and commerce 
with the enemy is to be discouraged or pro- 
hibited ; and, above all, a bitter and unfor- 
giving hatred is to reign for ever between 
the victor and the vanquished. This is the 
kind of viewi of the settlement of Europe 
that is constantly appearing in the articles 
and correspondence of the Press of all coun- 
tries. Ministers are not as careful as they 
should be to repudiate it. The nationalist 
and imperialist cliques of all nations endorse 
it. It is, one could almost fear, for some- 
thing like this that the peoples are being 
kept at war, and the very existence of civi- 
lization jeopardized. 



THE SETTLEMENT 143 

Now, whether anything of this kind really 
can be achieved by the war, whether there 
is the least probability that either group of 
Powers can win such a victory as would 
make the programme on either side a reality, 
I will not here discuss . The reader will have 
his own opinion. What I am concerned 
with is the effect any such solution would 
have upon the future of Europe. Those 
who desire such a close may be divided 
into two classes. The one frankly believes 
in war, in domination, and in power. It 
accepts as inevitable, and welcomes as de- 
sirable^ the perpetual armed conflict of 
nations for territory and trade. It does not 
believe in, and it does not want, a durable 
peace. It holds that all peace is, must be, 
and ought to be, a precarious and regret- 
table interval between wars. I do not dis- 
cuss this view. Those who hold it are not 
accessible to argument, and can only be 
met by action. There are others, however, 
who do think war an evil, who do want a 
durable peace, but who genuinely believe 
that the way indicated is the best way to 
achieve it. With them it is permitted to 
discuss, and it should be possible to do so 
without bitterness or rage on either side. 



144 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 

For as to the end, there is agreement ; the 
difference of opinion is as to the means. 
The position taken is this : The enemy de- 
hberately made this war of aggression against 
us, without provocation, in order to destroy 
us. If it had not been for this wickedness 
there would have been no war* The enemy, 
therefore, must be punished ; and his punish- 
ment must make him permanently impotent 
to repeat the offence. That having been 
done, Europe will have durable peace, for 
there will be no one left able to break it 
who will also want to break it. Now, I 
believe all this to be demonstrably a mis- 
calculation. It is contradicted both by our 
knowledge of the way human nature works 
and by the evidence of history. In the first 
place, wars do not arise because only one 
nation or group of nations is wicked, the 
others being ^ood. For the actual outbreak 
of this war, I believe, as I have already said, 
that a few powerful individuals in Austria and 
in Germany were responsible. But the ulti- 
mate causes of war lie much deeper. In them 
all States are implicated. And the punish- 
ment, or even the annihilation, of any one 
nation would leave those causes still sub- 
sisting. Wipe out Germany from the map, 



THE SETTLEMENT 145 

and, if you do nothing else, the other nations 
will be at one another's throats in the old 
way, for the old causes. They would be 
quarrelling, if about nothing else, about the 
division of the spoil. While nations con- 
tinue to contend for power, while they refuse 
to substitute law for force, there will con- 
tinue to be wars. And while they devote 
the best of their brains and the chief of 
their resources to armaments and military 
and naval organization, each war will become 
more terrible, more destructive, and more 
ruthless than the last. This is irrefutable 
truth. I do not believe there is a man or 
woman able to understand the statement who 
will deny it. 

In the second place, the enemy nation 
cannot, in fact, be annihilated, nor even so 
far weakened, relatively to the rest, as to 
be incapable of recovering and putting up 
another fight. The notions of dividing up 
Germany among the Allies, or of adding 
France and the British Empire to Germany, 
are sheerly fantastic. There will remain, when 
all is done, the defeated nations— if, indeed, 
any nation be defeated. Their territories 
cannot be permanently occupied by enemy 
troops ; they themselves cannot be perma- 

10 



146 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY. 

nently prevented by physical force from 
building up new armaments. So long as 
they want their revenge, they will be able 
sooner or later to take it. If evidence of 
this were wanted, the often-quoted case of 
Prussia after Jena will suffice. 

And, in the third place, the defeated 
nations, so treated, will, in fact, wiant their 
revenge. There seems to be a curious illu- 
sion abroad, among the English and their 
allies, that not only is Germany guilty of 
the war_, but that all Germans know* it in 
their hearts ; that, being guilty, they will 
fully accept punishment, bow patiently be- 
neath the yoke^ and become in future good, 
harmonious members of the European 
family. The illusion is grotesque. There 
is hardly a German who does not believe 
that the war was niade by Russia and by 
England ; that Germany is the innocent 
victim ; that all right is on her side, and 
all wrong on that of the Allies. If^ 
indeed, she were beaten, and treated as her 
" punishers " desire^ this belief would be 
strengthened^ not weakened. In every 
German heart would abide, deep and strong, 
the sense of an iniquitous triumph of what 
they believe to be wrong over right^^ and of a 



THE SETTLEMENT 147 

duty to redress that iniquity. Outraged 
national pride would be reinforced by the 
sense of injustice ; and the next war, the war 
of revenge, would be prepared for, not only 
by every consideration of interest and of 
passion, but by every cogency of righteous- 
ness. The fact that the Germans are mis- 
taken in their view of the origin of the war 
has really nothing to do with the case. It 
is not the truth, it is what men believe to 
be the truth, that influences their action. 
And I do not think any study of dispatches is 
going to alter the German view of the facts. 
But it is sometimes urged that the war 
was made by the German militarists, that 
it is unpopular with the mass of the people, 
and that if Germany is utterly defeated the 
people will rise and depose their rulers, 
become a true democracy, and join fraternal 
hands with the other nations of Europe. 
That Germany should become a true democ- 
racy might, indeed, be as great a guarantee 
of peace as it might be that other nations, 
called democratic, should really become so 
in their foreign policy as well as in their 
domestic affairs. But what proud nation 
will accept democracy as a gift from insolent 
conquerors ? One thing that the war has 



148 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 

done, and one of the worst, is to make of 
the Kaiser, to every German, a symbol of 
their national unity and national force. 
Just because we abuse their militarism, they 
affirm and acclaim it ; just because we attack 
their governing class, they rally round it. 
Nothing could be better calculated than this 
war to strengthen the hold of militarism in 
Gertnany^ unless it be the attempt of her 
enetnies to destroy her militarism' by force. 
For consider ! In the view we are examining 
it is proposed, first to kill the greater part 
of her combatants, next to invade her terri- 
tory, destroy her towns and villages, and 
exact (for there are those who demiand it) 
penalties in kind, actual tit for tat, for what 
Germans have done in Belgium. It is pro- 
posed to enter the capital in triumph. It 
is proposed to shear away huge pieces of 
German territory. And then, when all this 
has been done, the conquerors are to turn to 
the German nation and say : " Now, all this 
we have done for your good ! Depose your 
wicked rulers ! Become a democracy ! 
Shake hands and be a good fellow ! " Does 
it not sound grotesque? But, really, that is 
what is proposed. 

I have spoken about British and French 



THE CHANGE NEEDED 149 

proposals for the treatment of Germany. 
But all that I have said applies, of course, 
equally to German proposals of the same 
kind for the treatment of the conquered 
Allies. That way is no way towards a 
durable peace. If it be replied that a 
durable peace is not intended or desired, 
I have no more to say. If it be replied 
that punishment for its own sake is more 
important than civilization, and must be 
performed ut all costs—flat justltia, mat 
ccelufft— ■then, once more, I have nothing to 
say. I speak to those, and to those only, 
who do desire a durable peace, and who 
have the courage and the imagination to 
believe it to be possible, and the determina- 
tion to work for it. And to them I urge 
that the course I have been discussing can- 
not lead to their goal. Wha,t can? 



19. The Change Needed. 

First, a change of outlook. We must 
give up, in all nations, this habit of dwelling 
on the unique and peculiar wickedness of 
the enemy. We must recognize that behind 
the acts that led up to the immediate out- 



ISO THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 

break of war^ behind the crimes and atroci- 
ties to which the war has led, as wars always 
have led^ and always will lead— behind all 
that lies a great complex of feeling, preju- 
dice_, tradition, false theory, in which all 
nations and all individuals of all nations are 
involved. Most men believe, feel, or passively 
accept that power and wealth are the objects 
States ought to pursue ; that in pursuing 
these objects they are bound by no code 
of right in their relations to one another ; 
that law between them is, and must be, as 
fragile as a cobweb stretched before the 
mouth of a cannon ; that force is the only 
rule and the only determinant of their differ- 
ences, and that the only real question is 
when and how the appeal to force may most 
advantageously be made. This philosophy 
has been expressed with peculiar frankness 
and brutality by Germans. But most honest 
and candid men, I believe, will agree that 
that is the way they, too, have been accus- 
tomed to think of international affairs. And 
if illustration were wanted, let them remem- 
ber the kind of triumphant satisfaction with 
which the failure of the Hague conferences 
to achieve any radical results was generally 
greeted, and the contemptuous and almost 



THE CHANGE NEEDED 151 

abhorring pity meted out to the people called 
'* pacifists." Well, the war has come I We 
see now, not only guess, what it means. 
If that experience has not made a deep 
impression on every man and woman, if 
something like a conversion is not being 
generally operated, then, indeed, nothing 
can save mankind from the hell of their 
own passions and imbecilities. 

But if otherwise, if that change is going 
on, then the way to deliverance is neither 
difficult nor obscure. It does not lie in the 
direction of crushing anybody. It lies in 
the taking of certain determinations, and 
the embodying of them in certain institutions . 

•First, the nations must submit to law and 
to right in the settlement of their disputes. 

Secondly, they must reserve force for the 
coercion of the law-breaker ; and that im- 
plies that they should construct rules to 
determine who the law-breaker is. Let 
him be defined as the one who appeals to 
force, instead of appealing to law and right 
by machinery duly provided for that pur- 
pose, and the aggressor is immediately 
under the ban of the civilized world, and 
met by an overwhelming force to coerce him 
into order. In constructing machinery of 



152 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 

this kind there is no intellectual difficulty 
greater than that which has confronted 
every attempt everywhere to substitute order 
for force. The difficulty is moral, and lies 
in the habits, passions, and wills of men. 
But it should not be concluded that, if such a 
moral change could be operated, there would 
be no need for the machinery. It would be 
as reasonable to say that Governments, law- 
courts, and police were superfluous, since, 
if men were good, they would not require 
them, and if they are bad they will not 
tolerate them. Whatever new need^ desire, 
and conviction comes up in mankind, needs 
embodiment in forms before it can become 
operative. And^ as the separate colonies of 
America could not effectively unite until 
they had formed a Constitution, so will the 
States of Europe and the world be unable to 
maintain the peace, even though all of them 
should wish to maintain it, unless they will 
construct some kind of machinery for settling 
their disputes and organizing their common 
purposes, and will back that machinery by 
force. If they will do that they may con- 
struct a real and effective counterpoise to 
aggression from any Power in the future. 
If they will not do it, their precautions 



THE CHANGE NEEDED 153 

against any one Power will be idle, for it 
will be from some other Power that the 
danger will come. I put it to the reader 
at the end of this study, which I have made 
with all the candour and all the honesty at 
my disposal, and which I believe to repre- 
sent essentially the truth, whether or no he 
agrees that the European anarchy is the 
real cause of European wars, and if he does, 
whether he is ready for his part to support 
a serious effort to end it. 



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Towards a Lasting Settlement 

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Above the Battle 

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boldest solution is safest and simplest." — Manchester Guardian. 

" His work is of the utmost value as a storehouse of information, 
argument, and suggestion." — Common Cause. 

The Future of Democracy 

By H. M. HYNDMAN 

Author of " England for All," " The Historical Basis of Socialism," 

"The Commercial Crises of the Nineteenth Century," "The 

Bankruptcy of India," " The Economics of Sociahsm," 

" Reminiscences and Further Reminiscences." 

Crotvn %vo. 2.S. 6d. net. 

" Well worth reading." — Manchester Courier. 

"Written with all his old force and lucidity."— ForM/r^ Post. 

The Coming Scrap of Paper 

By EDWARD W. EDSALL 

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" One of the most interesting and illuminative of recent financial 
essays, set forth with skill and lucidity."— F/na«c/a/ News 



The Deeper Causes of 

the War 

By monsieur EMILE HOVELAQUE 

Inspecteur General de I'lnstruction Publique 

Translated by CLOUDESLEY BRERETON, M.A., and 

L. S. WALTERS, Docteur de I'Universite 

Crown Svo, Cloth. 2s. dd. net. 

This little book, which is regarded in France as one of the most able, if 
not the ablest, expose of the deeper causes of the war, analyses the growth 
and psychology of Prussia and the subsequent Prussianization of Germany. 
It brings out very clearly that war is the national industry of Prussia, and 
that German Realpolitik is a sort of mystic blend of the theory of the 
Germans as " the chosen people " and the gospel of Prussian success. 
The book ends with a masterly survey of England as seen through 
German spectacles. 

War and Civilization 

By the Rt. Hon. J. M. ROBERTSON, M.P. 

Author of " The Evolution of States," " Patriotism and Empire," etc. 
Crown ^vo. is. 6d. net. 

"A spirited piece of international polemic. It is always acute, 
moderate and well informed." — Manchester Guardian. 

" Is a sufficiently shattering piece of argument. We hope his book 
will be widely circulated." — Daily News. 

The French Renascence 

By Dr. CHARLES SAROLEA 

Large Crown Svo. Cloth. With Illustrations. 5;. net. 

A series of literary sketches of famous French personalities. The 
contents include: Montaigne — Montaigne and Nietzsche — Pascal's 
"Thoughts " — Pascal and Newman — Madame de Maintenon — Liselotte : a 
German Princess at the Court of Louis XIV — An Historical Romance of 
the French Huguenots — Rousseau's " Emile " — Marie Antoinette and the 
Revolution — Mirabeau — Robespierre — The Real Napoleon — Napoleon as 
a Socialist — Balzac — Flaubert — Maeterlinck — The Condemnation of 
Maeterlinck — Bergson — Poincare — The French Renaissance. 

Most of the sketches are accompanied by portraits, and the whole 
sequence forms a comprehensive review of literary and political France 
from the sixteenth century to the present time. 



A Short History of English 

T?nvol T 1^ From the Anglo-Saxon Invasion 
iVUrai JL/lie to the Present Time 

By MONTAGUE FORDHAM, MA. (Cantab). 

With a Preface by CHARLES BATHURST, M.A., M.P. 

Large Crown 8vo. zs. dd. net. 

Most of us know something of the Enghsh manor, and many of us have 
views on the subject of " Enclosures," but rural history, as a whole, has 
been an undiscovered country to all save a few distinguished authorities. 
There will be no excuse in the future for this ignorance, for Mr. Montague 
Fordham has gathered together the result of the investigations of many 
profound students of special periods of English rural life, and has created 
thereout his " Short History of English Rural Life." Mr. Montague 
Fordham belongs to a family that has taken a leading part amongst the 
squires and farmers of East Anglia for many centuries ; it is, therefore, 
not surprising to find that he has a special knowledge of the outlook of 
these classes. He has further made a very careful study of the English 
labourer and of the class of small men who lie between farmer and 
labourer. This intimate knowledge of rural human nature has given a 
special character to his book. But it is not only a book written by a 
countryman for people interested in English country life, but a handbook 
for students, well schemed, and full of valuable information. 

The Curse of the Hohenzollern 

By Dr. CHARLES SAROLEA 

Fcap. '^vo. Paper Covers. is. net. 

In this volume Dr. Sarolea deals with the Hohenzollern dynasty from 
the Great Elector to the present Emperor. He shows how the military 
spirit grew in Prussia, and how all the German people gradually became 
subjected to it. 

The Murder of Nurse Cavell 

By Dr. CHARLES SAROLEA 

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The Cavell crime, which will for ever rank as a damning indictment 
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Host vivid manner. All the correspondence which passed between the 
various ambassadors is reproduced, and the whole, together with Dr. 
>arolea'3 condemnatory introduction, furnishes a comprehensive record of 
he tragedy and the motives which led to it. 



My Days and Dreams 

Being Autobiographical Notes 
By EDWARD CARPENTER 

Author of "Towards Democracy" 

Demy %z>o. Cloth. Illustrated. 7;. 6d. net. 

Mr. Edward Carpenter's volume of Reminiscences will excite con- 
siderable attention owing to the rather exceptional career of the author 
of " Civilization : its Cause and Cure " and " Towards Democracy." 
His flight from conventional conditions and adoption of plain and 
democratic modes of life not only serve to illustrate his ideals, but seem 
to have brought him into touch with a vast number of interesting people 
of all classes, whose personalities are touched in with his usual vigour 
and subtlety. 

Dostoievsky : His Life and 
Literary Activity 

By EVGENII SOLOVIEV 

Translated by C. J. HOGARTH 

Large Crown %vs. ^s. net. 

" An admirable study of the man in all the stress and strain of his 
storm-tossed circumstances, as well as in all the diversities of his 
impulsive moods." — Standard. 

The Life Romance of 
Lloyd George 

By BERIAH EVANS 

With a Special Introduction by Dr. CHARLES SAROLEA 

Paper bounds zs. net. Cloth bounds 3/. 6d. net. 

The book does not assume to be a biography of Mr. Lloyd George. It 
is something better and far more fascinating than a mere biography. It 
amounts really to a pen picture and character sketch of the statesman in 
various aspects of his public life. While no essential incident in his 
remarkable career is overlooked, that career is presented in a series of 
pen-pictures, each dealing with some outstanding characteristic from 
earliest childhood to the present day. 



Edward Carpenter's Works 

Towards Democracy 

Library Edition, 4s. 6d. net. Pocket Edition, 35. 6d. net. 

England's Ideal 

12th Thousand. 2s. 6d. net and is. net. 

Civilization : Its Cause and Cure 

Essays on Modern Science, 13th Thousand. 2S. 6d. net and is. net. 

Love's Coming of Age : On the Relations ot 

the Sexes. 12th Thousand. 3s. 6d. net. 

Angels' Wings. Essays on Art and Life 

Ilhistrated. Third Edition. 4<;. 6d. net. 

Adam's Peak to Elephanta : Sketches in Ceylon 

and India. New Edition. 4s. 6^/. net. 

A Visit to a Gnani. Four Chapters reprinted 

from Adam's Peak io Elephanta. With New Preface, and 2 
Photogravures. Large Crown 8vo, ^ cloth, is. dd. net. 

An Anthology of Friendship : lolaus 

New and Enlarged Edition. 2s. 6d. net. 

The Promised Land : A Drama of a People's 

Deliverance. Crown 8vo, 2s. 6d. net. 

Chants of Labour : A Songbook for the People, 

with Frontispiece and Cover by Walter Crane. 7th Thousand, is.net. 

The Art of Creation : Essays on the Self and 

its Powers. Second Edition. 3s. 6d. net. 

Days with Walt Whitman 3s. 6d. net. 

The Intermediate Sex : A Study of some 

Transitional Types of Men and Women. Third Edition. 3s. 6d. net. 

The Drama of Love and Death : A Story of 

Human Evolution and Transfiguration. Second Edition. 5s. net. 

Intermediate Types among Primitive Folk : A 

study in Social Evolution. 4s. 6d. net. 

The Healing of Nations 

Third Edition. Crown 8vo, Cloth, 2s. 6d. net ; Paper, 2S. net. 

The Simplification of Life. From the Writings 

of Edward Carpenter. Crown 8vo. New Edition. 2s. net. 



The Museum Library 



Small Crown %vo. Cloth. 



2S. 7iet. 



Everyone desires to have a good general knowledge of English litera- 
ture. The days, however, of wide general reading are past. Business 
and the vast amount of ephemeral literature allow one but little time for 
reading the best works. It is essential, therefore, that this limited time 
should not be wasted, and some guidance in the selection of authors to 
read becomes highly necessary. This has proved hitherto a most dis- 
couraging difficulty, but the Publishers of " The Museum Library " con- 
fidently believe that they have discovered a satisfactory solution to it. 

The Library will consist of twenty volumes ; each volume will contain a 
biographical study, a complete bibliography, and an annotated selection of 
the principal works of the author who is being dealt with. The last 
volume will consist of a selection of famous studies on the nineteen 
authors who form the library. With each volume a portrait will be 
given, and such notes and explanations as will render the reading most 
interesting and profitable. 



The list of authors 


is as follows : 






Chaucer 


Bacon 


Pope 


Carlyle 


Caxton 


Milton 


Gibbon 


Macaulay 


Tindale 


Locke 


Wordsworth 


Tennyson 


Spenser 


Addison 


Scott 


Browning 


Shakespeare 


Swift 


Byron 





FIRST VOLUME 

ROBERT BROWNING : A Synthetical Anthology. Edited by 
George Goodchild. Printed on good paper and artistically bound, 
356 pp., 2s. nd. 

This volume will be of great service to all those who wish for a fuller 
understanding of Browning's genius. It shows the development of 
Browning's poetical conception from the comparative crudeness of 
'• Pauline " to the finished greatness of " The Ring and the Book." 
There are numerous notes, a biographical sketch, and a Bibliography. 

Views on Some Social Subjects 



By Sir DYCE DUCKWORTH, Bt. 



Dtm^ %vo. 



js. 6d. net. 



" On all the subjects he discusses (he) brings to bear an aristocratic and 
urbane judgment." — Lancet. 

" We consult a wise specialist, and he tells us with a genial tolerance 
and dignity all that he believes to be true and useful. Every paper has 
the same charm." — Saturday Review. 



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